On a broad basis, though, untrusted certificates are blocked outright. I'm sure you can understand that for every one-to-one or one-to-few valid communications like your case, there are dozens or hundreds of one-to-many not-so-valid communications. SSL has certificate trust built in for a reason. Engineers may laugh at security professionals, but we're here for a reason. Even though we're directly at odds with each other in approach, our goal is the same. You want to help further the business by pushing new software. We want to further the business by making sure that software is secure. No one benefits from the new e-commerce solution if the business bank account is completely drained the day after the product launches.
I can come up with a hundred good reasons why I should be able to enter a store after business hours, pick up a few things, and leave (I left the money on the counter!), but for some reason businesses still lock their doors. Do you laugh at them for having completely backwards requirements?
I can actually take your key analogy into true story territory. I worked at an office where a manager had to be gone for a month. He had the only key and the policy to get a new key wouldn't get one to us for weeks. It was also against policy for him to give the key to someone else while he was gone. The solution was to simply leave all the doors unlocked while he was gone.
I understand the need for security. I understand that security is your job and that you don't want to compromise for mediocre security. However, when you won't compromise, we don't get great security. We get no security.
I agree that strict policies with no recourse for exceptions is a bad thing. I don't know of anyone who would stand up under that kind draconian stance.
In the example in question (which frankly isn't very interesting, I can come up with hundreds of scenarios like this) I have a git archive I need to share with someone on an ad-hoc basis. For whatever reason, I'd like to do it securely, so it needs authentication and encryption and shouldn't go on anyone else's site. So the obvious solution is to throw it up on a static webserver somewhere and use TLS (or use ssh, of course, but that's subject to exactly the same root-of-trust problem as a self-signed cert -- surely you disallow outbound ssh access too, right? right?).
Your fantasy world wants to pretend requirements like this don't exist, and that you can simply refuse to support this kind of transfer via fiat. But it's not the real world. In the real world, this is what people have to do. Unless you break their systems, in which case they'll work around your silly rules in even less secure ways.