The operator passed on personal information without knowing if a Hetzner employee might be the bad guy. Hetzner passed on personal information without knowing the server owner might be the bad guy.
If the operator had contacted the server owner directly to let him know his box was hacked, the result would have been the same.
Why did the operator have the expectation that an uplink of the server wouldn't just forward the mail to the server owner?
If EFNet are going to report the issue then there has to be a trust worthy contact at some point along the chain of network ownership, and Hetzner should have been that point. Quite frankly, it's irresponsible for a company of that size to behave in that way.
I've personally tracked botnets infecting thousands of machines back to command and control servers at Hetzner. Guess what happens when you send off the report? They forward it to the bot herder.
If the log included chat between the malicious user and the operator, the malicious user __already knows__ the operator's nick, so there's no additional information. If the log doesn't include that, then what reason is there to include the nickname of the operator?
Rather than expecting Someone Else to sanitize our information (which fields do you feel are critical to redact? real name? phone number? IP? zodiac sign? Made-up-nickname?), it seems like it's a good idea to proactively redact the information ourself before making that abuse report.