Nonsense. The EU just made the depositors junior to the bondholders of the bank! On what planet does that not have permanent implications for trust in the banking system?
Every EU depositor (esp in Greece, Spain and Italy) should start thinking about where to store their money besides the "insured" banks. Hell, with 0% interest in US banks, the FDIC should at least make some high-profile statement saying this would never happen in the US.
Edit: As near as I can tell, Nemo gets the real rationale correct - https://self-evident.org/?p=962
Why is the EU promoting such fragmentation? Again, remember there are a lot of political and financial flows constraints here that are unique. Pragmatism must trump principle. The choices to the bailout team were let the Cypriot economy crater by refusing funds, grant funds and watch foreign depositors leave the islanders with 145 percent debt to current GDP, or take rapid measures.
My hope is that this prompts the EMU to finally implement a pooled depositor insurance scheme. The present scheme is akin to each state in the U.S. providing its own depositor insurance.
Not for any definition of "depositor insurance" that I'm familiar with. The whole point was that the investors of the bank would lose their money first, then a gov't agency would make good on the deposits.
Anything less is a return to the days of unstable swings banking and deflationary depressions. Or perhaps the wizards at the EU thought/didn't care that Cyprus would join Greece in their deflationary depression: But the signal to Spain and Italy is abundantly clear: Anyone who leaves their money in a bank in those countries is not paying attention.
If the people there roll over without too much fuss, stealing directly from deposit holders will become the template for future banking bail-outs.
Bondholders and shareholders of Spanish and Italian banks could then avoid losses on their bad investments by pointing to Cyprus as a shining example of things done right.
It absolutely is. When a bank fails, the regulating institution steps in and performs the capital restructuring. The statement of depositor insurance is that they are to be made whole, even if the regulatory institution must dip into the depositor insurance fund.
The EU restructured the Cyprus banks, but they did not haircut the bondholders for the difference, as has been done in every other bank failure since the Great Depression.
But to summarize, when both the banking system and the government is insolvent it's relatively obvious to me that loses should be imposed in this order:
1. First bank shareholders should be wiped out(!),
2. then junior bondholders,
3. then senior bondholders and uninsured depositors,
4. then government bond holders,
5. and finally, only if the above doesn't cover it, insured deposit holders will have to take a haircut.
What we're seeing now is more or less a jump straight to 5.
It should be less arbitrary that the current scheme, where senior bondholders and the ECB are not being touched.
If you look at the balance sheet of Cyprus Laiki half way down http://ftalphaville.ft.com/2013/03/16/1425732/a-stupid-idea-... then you see that debt is almost nothing. There is a lot of central bank (ECB indirectly) money which has not been haircut. The decision to haircut the "insured" depositors was a political one, allegedly made by Cyprus itself.
"On the activation of the DPS, an announcement is made in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Cyprus and in the local press stating that the member bank is unable to repay its deposits and specifying the manner in which claims could be submitted and the necessary documentary evidence that accompany each claim."
This is not related to the restructuring and payment of creditors (which usually takes years, while deposit insurance pays out quickly). The deposit fund it is true then becomes a creditor and might get some money back later. This happened with eg insured UK depositors in Iceland.
The ECB has not restructured the Cyprus Banks. Cyprus is going to inject equity into them as a going concern, the equity paid for from this tax (and then the equity will be distributed to the taxpayers). This not really restructuring and other models where banks are left as going concerns with arbitrary appropriation of various bonds (somewhat at random it is true) is becoming normal in Europe (eg see SNS Reaal).
The banks are run by citizens and funded by citizens. So when the banks "fuck up", it's going to end up on those same citizens. There is no way to isolate losses to some "bank" entity.
Hell, Harris Bank in Chicago is owned by Bank of Montreal--so, unless I'm grossly misunderstanding the situation, it would be entirely possible for Canadian executives to set policies that could affect clients in the US. That's not those citizens' faults.
I think you have an incorrect view here.
The majority of shares are owned by American citizens and the executive and board are mostly Americans.
This is not so. The Bundesbank gets regularly overthrown by the majority in the ECB panel when it comes to decision about this. Respectable Bundes-Bankers have already resigned, because of that.
Thats why the ECB holds billions (i.e. american billions = 1e9) of greek, italian, spain, portugese state debt.
And this despite the fact that the ECB is not allowed to engage in financing states by the treaties. And all this despite the no bailout rule in the treaties. The treaties are not worth more as a piece of used toilet paper, but the politicians cannot understand why the hell people get more and more anti EUR.
Personally, I don't have a clue as to the answers to those questions, and I doubt that those who are imposing this tax have a clue, either.
It seems extremely unwise to publicise this fact, however - which is what this measure does.
And Iceland chose not to receive "economic help".
Greece and Cyprus were forced to receive "economic help".
Not AFAIK. Their alternatives were just worse.
There's a little bit of subjectivity in assigning those numbers, because a number of pro-bailout/austerity parties were trying as hard as possible to take up tough-sounding, qualified positions, e.g. in the first round Democratic Left was "less" pro- than the others, even though it eventually joined a coalition government that implemented the demanded conditions. So one could argue that Greek sentiment was more anti-bailout/austerity than the results implied, since some people voted for what they thought were moderate anti- parties who turned out to be grudgingly pro- in practice.
Party A was in power until 2009.
During the 2009 elections party A said: "Oops! We're screwed! No more money!". Party B said: "No! Party A is lying! There are lots of money!".
Guess who won? That's right: Party B.
0.0000001 seconds later
Party B: "After all there is no money as we thought... But hey! We're in charge now! We'll save you! It's what we do best!". Nobody said that what they do best isn't very nice...
Forward to 2012.
Party B: "Vote us, so that we'll keep saving you with our great plan and our great banker friends!"
Party A: "Noooo!!! Don't vote for Party B! Their plan and their banker friends are baaaaaaaad!!! We have a better solution! A magic solution!"
Guess again who won? That's right: Party A.
0.0000001 seconds later
Party A: "Shit! Actually Party B's plan is the only real plan... But we are in charge now! Why bother to bring back Party B to keep going with their plan? We can do it as well! Probably even better!"
The End.
Desperate people? Yes. Retarded voters? Yes. Incompetent government? Not really. Corrupted government? Most likely.
>"This whole thing is entirely unfair for the people living in Cyprus. The average citizen had nothing to do with the banking sector stocking up on Greek debt, but now they have to pay for it."
Foreign deposits are flighty. The loan-for-austerity solution is too slow. The Cypriot financial minister has already noted "substantial outflows" from banks over the past few weeks [2]. Announcing a future tax would leave the burden exclusively on ordinary Cypriot depositors. This measure was intended to help the Cypriots, not burn them.
Further, the mark-downs on Greek debt is a proximal, but not the root, cause of the problem. The IMF warned Cyprus in 2011 to raise capital levels, potentially by slashing deposit rates - it did not. Ratings agencies chimed in, in 2012, that private sector losses would result if Cyprus did not increase contributions to bank capital. Complicating the situation is that 15-20 percent of Russian bank capital and nearly 10 percent of Russian corporate deposits sit in Cyprus - there was probably external pressure to keep the banks leveraged.
Pre-crisis, Cyprus stood out for its high growth (almost 4%) and low unemployment (low of 3.6% in 2008), despite a falling savings rate, rising labour costs, and a red hot real estate market following its accession into the eurozone in 2004 [3]. Today, we have a zero growth economy with a banking crisis that would have tipped its debt/GDP from 87% to 145%.
Cyprus needs a capital injection equal to half of GDP. This was never going to be painless.
>"So what do investors, businesses, and savvy savers do? They pull their money from banks in the troubled euro countries. No need to take the risk, even if it’s small."
This is unlikely - the EU banking environment is already highly re-patrimonialised. Non-financial corporate and high net worth deposits have already fled to the degree that they can. Domestic depositors are, for better or worse, less flighty (and savvy) than senior bank debt investors - hence the logic for preserving their latter at the expense of the former. Also Cypriot banks have very little senior bank debt (0.3% of assets for Laiki [4]). This is cruel, yes, and I sound with The Economist's criticism of the tax levied on minor accounts (those holding less than €100 000). But forced de-leveraging will be cruel.
Given the political constraints from Deutschland limiting the ability of the European Central Bank to launch into Fed-style monetary base expansion and its Landesbanks preventing euro-wide deposit insurance, the bank regulatory constraints imposed by a country relying on flighty deposits for financial stability, and the economic constraints of a highly-indebted nation in the middle of a geopolitical brouhaha between Greece, Turkey, and Russia slated for near zero growth in the near future, this is not a terrible deal. Note that Iceland, which was in a similar position in 2007, saw its economy crater by nearly 1/3 from 2007 to 2011, or about 9% annually. Peak (2007) to trough (2009), 3/5.
[1] http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2013/03/13/russias-cyprus-p...
[2] http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/3/83fb0dd2-8802-11e2-b011-00144...
[3] https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=25382.... 2011 Cypriot IMF Article IV Consultation
[4] http://ftalphaville.ft.com/2013/03/16/1425732/a-stupid-idea-...