Here I was, thinking that the security checkpoint was a measure to make everyone feel safer. Thanks for clearing that one up!
"An attack looks like it will take so much effort that the terrorist is no longer interested (terrorists are lazy, too) or capable"
Except that you can buy or obtain all the things needed to kill people on an airplane on the other side of the security check. You can buy glass, you can get knives from restaurants, etc. The fact that you get a security check long before you are anywhere near an airplane leaves a lot of room for an attacker, even a solo terrorist who is not particularly creative.
Note that the Israeli approach involves walking up to the door of an airplane without any carry-ons or shoes. Profiling is needed to determine who is even worth the attention (if they did that to everyone, there would be riots). Meanwhile, the TSA will let you bring a pocket knife onto a plane, which is more than enough to kill people.
The real difference today is not that terrorists have a harder time bringing weapons onto planes, but that passengers and crew do not believe they will survive a hijacking. People will now fight back. The locked cockpit doors -- locked from the inside -- help a lot too. Any security beyond explosives detection is pointless, and you could have that sort of security right at the departure gates.
I personally doubt that the TSA checkpoints were ever meant to keep us secure. The Bush administration just needed to reassure people that we would have better security than we did beforehand, in a visible and easy-to-understand way. Now the agency is huge and no politician can afford to void against checkpoints, just in case a clever terrorist manages to hijack a plane (or perhaps shoot it down with a surface-to-air missile; people would probably blame lax airport security in that case too). It also helps that so many contracts are awarded for building the TSA's equipment, and that the TSA has substantially weakened Americans' ideas about civil rights (and what mainstream politician will complain about such things?).
I have my doubts about that as well. I would think that the lack of K-9 teams near departure gates is a good sign that bombings are not the concern of the TSA when it comes to airport security. Bombings are probably a concern somewhere, but the security checkpoints do not seem to do much when it comes to stopping a bomb plot.
Keep in mind that private planes are exempt from the security checks. If a terrorist wanted to blow up a commercial plane, what would stop them from chartering a private jet, bringing bombs on board, and then ramming their explosive-laden plane into an airliner mid-flight? Why even bother doing it in flight? A terrorist might just roll their chartered jet into a fully-loaded passenger plane on the runway, and blow up a plane in front of a crowd of people.
Perhaps there is some other procedure in place to ensure that no bombs can make it past the numerous ways that people and vehicles can enter an airport without going through a security checkpoint. If that is the case, what is the purpose of the checkpoint? Why not just apply whatever techniques prevent terrorists from ramming private jets into airliners to the rest of the airport, and let us keep our rights intact?
It is also worth pointing out that there are lots of other bombing targets that are not being bombed, despite a complete lack of security. Anyone can bring large packages onto the NYC subways without any harassment or scanning, yet those trains (which are packed with hundreds of people during the rush hour) have not been blown up. A truck full of explosives could easily drive onto a major bridge. Yet despite these clear vulnerabilities, and despite the fact that other countries see such attacks and more, we rarely have them here. Are airlines really more special targets for bombers than urban transit systems?
An explosion in the air, or abuse of the plane as a missile as happened on 9-11, is a much bigger problem because the potential destructive radius is much larger and the area of incidence much less predictable. The costs of that happening in a city center in 2001 were staggering; likewise, consider the economic impact of an airliner plunging into or blowing up over a nuclear power station, which might result in less actual destruction but far more severe public panic and economic disruption.
It has not happened yet, and hopefully it never will happen. The bomb itself would probably be difficult to procure and transport to New York City without being detected by an intelligence agency. What we can say is this: body scanners, luggage X-rays, and shoe removal have done nothing to prevent such an attack, because no such measures are in place.
As an example of the difference, consider the Oklahoma city truck bomb had explosive force equivalent to 5 kilotons of TNT, involved 13 barrels of explosive, and other materials, requiring a small box truck to transport. It did horrendous damage, but in terms of pure destructive force it wrecked about 1/3 of a 9-story building. The two plane impacts on the WTC, by contrast, caused the total collapse of two 80-story skyscrapers. There was lots of ancillary damage in both cases, but I stand by my arguments that it's harder to predict where an attack from the air will occur and that the destructive potential is typically larger in the case of a successful attack, because of the extra mass, speed, and height inputs.
Secondly the reason commercial airlines are different from smaller planes and other bombing targets is because you can use one to kill tens of thousands of people (fly into large skyscrapers). You can't do that with a car bomb or crashing a small plane into a large one.
And the fact you have these incidents at all should tell you that airline security is important.
I have yet to see them at an American airport. Maybe we have been flying to different places.
"Secondly the reason commercial airlines are different from smaller planes and other bombing targets is because you can use one to kill tens of thousands of people"
Tens of thousands? That's funny, because the largest terrorist attack on American soil involved airplanes and killed about 3000 people.
"You can't do that with a car bomb or crashing a small plane into a large one."
I was replying to someone who claimed that the job of the TSA is to prevent an airline bombing. Crashing a private jet into a commercial jet is a perfectly valid counterexample.
"And the fact you have these incidents at all should tell you that airline security is important."
We had one successful attack, which was extremely well planned and extremely well coordinated. We spend billions of dollars each year on the TSA. Billions of dollars because of an event so rare that we can only point to one occurrence.
Meanwhile, millions of people ride urban transit systems in large cities every day, and none of them are subjected to even the most rudimentary security. A subway train in New York has a capacity of over two thousand people, which is around how many would be on a packed rush hour train. A single terrorist could kill a large number of those people by detonating a powerful enough bomb while the train is going over a bridge or through a river tunnel (and probably in many other places). Yet despite that terrifying possibility, there are no body scanners, no bag X-rays, no shoe removal requirements, and no security lines at subway stations.
You can go ahead and cling to the idea that the TSA's airport security program is keeping us safe. The reality is that their program does almost nothing to promote safety or security; it is all the work that you do not see that is keeping you safe. The body scanners are not even a piece of the puzzle, they are a distraction meant to help people like you feel safe.
You can buy glass, you can get knives from restaurants.
I can't speak for US terminals but in many international ones. The glass you get isn't large enough to cause serious damage e.g. snowdomes and the knives in restaurants have deliberately dull blades. And cockpit doors whilst locked from the inside are routinely opened in order to provide food/drinks to the captain. So it's hardly a fool proof system.But hey don't let me stop with your confused anti-TSA crusade.
The thing is, I am not a terrorist. What I see as potential weapons are probably just the tip of the iceberg of things that can be turned into a weapon. Prisoners manage to make weapons out of all sorts of seemingly innocuous objects. What makes you think that the things I can identify as possible weapons are an evenly remotely exhaustive list? What makes you think that a terrorist could not find more weapons on the other side of security?
And the knives rely on serration to cut through steak so are very dull.
And given that every country in the world has a TSA and abides by almost identical rules I would guess that there is a lot of people thinking about ways to make us safer. Why isn't the status quo the safest yet reasonable measures we have ?
I am pretty sure a terrorist would (a) practice smashing bottles until he can reliably create a weapon and (b) smash the bottle before boarding the plane, in an empty bathroom (I have been to international airports where no flights depart from an entire section during the night, yet passengers are free to wander around or sit in those sections), and just carry it on board because there are no security checks before boarding the plane.
"And the knives rely on serration to cut through steak so are very dull."
So you think a somewhat dull serrated edge could not be used as a weapon? Prisoners manage to use far less effective weapons to kill each other; why couldn't terrorists do it?
"given that every country in the world has a TSA"
What is your point? Everyone has a public display of their airport security? Do you think that it is impossible that everyone just wants their citizens to feel safe and that the point of a public security check is to do just that?
Despite what media people say, profiling is a large (but not only!) part of what happens there. It may not be PC, but it is true, and there are very few Israelis who have serious problem with that. I'm not sure if it is possible to borrow the system wholesale for the US - both threats and targets to protect are very different - but I can say definitely that Israel system seems to be effective and not hugely annoying to most (not all - as I said, there are horror stories) of the people, and TSA seems to be the reverse - not very effective, but hugely annoying. I think TSA should bring in some common sense. I know this may create vulnerabilities, but come on, taking toys from 5-year-olds is not necessary. What is necessary is to create a system that would detect behavior that would suggest this particular 5-year-old may be used for illicit purposes and only then check this particular toy. I believe this is possible and Israel experience could help.
I wish airlines had a choice to use the TSA or not, because then we could vote with our wallets. But no, we are being forced to be groped by imbeciles who think that patting down frightened five year olds is worth it. While the finer points of your analysis are correct, the most compelling argument against the TSA lies outside the scope of your analysis. The idea that you can have absolute safety is a farce. Whenever we want more safety, we have to ask ourselves at what cost it's worth that safety. The TSA is a political response to an anomaly, and somewhere along the line we forgot that we are giving up our freedom by chasing ghosts.
So we waste billions of dollars per year to "force terrorists to up their game."
So you would rather make it easier for them ? TSA screeners are largely incompetent.
Evidence please. they need only set off a bomb in the main terminal entrance
They could set off a bomb anywhere. A plane is unique in that you could fly into a large skyscraper and kill tens of thousands of people. groped by imbeciles who think that patting down frightened five year olds
Equating someone doing their job with a paedophile is a much, no ?False dichotomy. You can make it harder for them, or say it is already hard enough, without TSA. TSA is not the only way ever not to make it easy for terrorists.
>>>> Equating someone doing their job with a paedophile is a much, no ?
"Someone doing their job" should know better than that, or don't get this job. "Just doing my job" is not an excuse of bad behavior, that thing was settled in a little town called Nuremberg. I wouldn't go as far as saying TSA workers derive sexual pleasure from groping children, but they should know a lot of what they are doing is wrong, and if they do it, they bear moral responsibilities for the abuse. Each time TSA worker does something repulsive and justifies himself with "I'm just following instructions" - he's committing a moral crime, even if not a legal one. And this should be told over and over so everybody would know what is being done - so that when TSA worker has a beer with his neighbor, the neighbor would say "TSA? The guys that pat down five-year olds? How that's working out for you?"
The purpose of the TSA is not to catch every piece of contraband; it is to reduce "aircraft attacks" [EDIT: by aircraft attacks, I maan "attacks against the airplane itself," that is, bombings capable of bringing down the plane. Hijackings are not really feasible anymore]. For that purpose, it does not have to be 100% effective, or even 95% effective, or even 90% effective; it just has to raise the apparent level of difficulty high enough such that:
a) An attack looks like it will take so much effort that the terrorist is no longer interested (terrorists are lazy, too) or capable. Attack frequency is inversely proportional to effort involved. If all a terrorist had to do to down a plane is click on a link in a web-browser, we would see catastrophes daily; if the sophistication of the attack is such that it takes months of training, the frequency drops by orders and orders of magnitude.
b) It forces a terrorist to get help from other terrorists; while a solo terrorist is hard to detect in advance, terrorist networks and their communications are routinely infiltrated by law enforcement and intelligence.
In this respect, pat-downs and body scanners force terrorists to up their game, which, in turn, discourages attacks from ever taking place. The Israelis also use this method [1] but they apply it more selectively based on the background of the passenger, which saves resources and, while politically difficult, is a much better approach.
[1] "At Ben-Gurion, some passengers have been searched so thoroughly that they have had to walk through the terminals, the gates and up to the doors of their planes with no handbags, wallets or even shoes." http://www.cleveland.com/world/index.ssf/2010/11/tsa_alterna...