Re:Torvalds clarifies Linux's Windows 8 Secure Boot position
by JoshTriplett on Thursday February 28, 2013 @06:25PM
(#5301785)
Because then your trust path includes the userspace insmod utility and every library and system service it depends on, all of which would themselves need signature verification and hardening against things like LD_LIBRARY_PATH (even from root).
Otherwise, you can easily construct a harmful payload consisting of the distro-signed Shim, that kernel, and a modified userspace that loads an arbitrary module which takes over the kernel and runs arbitrary code in ring 0. And then that distro's Secure Boot signing key gets revoked.
Why do they have to embed the ID of whitelisted modules in the signed kernel? Why not have a kernel that will load any module the root user tells it to load, then have userland insmod utility verify the signatures using a configuration file like /etc/accepted_module_signers.conf?