[1] Of course you also shouldn't sometimes use probabilities. If we have statistics saying that witnesses lie 15% of the time, is it helpful to present expert testimony to the effect of "there is a 15% probability the witness is lying?" Such evidence is not useful and also impinges on the fundamental right of the jury to judge witness credibility.
I don't have a problem with not using probability to model lack of knowledge, but you have to apply that principle consistently (and whether it is ethically desirable to use probability is an entirely different and even more difficult question than whether or not it leads to accurate beliefs). That said, I do prefer to use probability to model lack of knowledge, because what is the alternative? Ad hoc gut feeling based reasoning?
What he should have done, the second quote says, is to "arrive[s] at its conclusion by considering on an overall assessment of the evidence". Instead of considering what happened before, he should have taken his priors from the evidence. So, in the end, it's a sentence that supports a Bayesian methodology, in this case. Or maybe the Court of Appeal just was confused at the time, who knows.
You can say there is a 25% increase in chance of dying
if you smoke. You cannot say there is a 25% chance that
the nurse murdered those people - she either did or did
not. (what we lack is the knowledge of the past event)
second para: On the preponderance of evidence, the court believes
beyond a reasonable doubt that the nurse *did* kill those
people. That event A *did* happen - we have used evidence
to fill in the gaps of our knowledge.
We are not assigning a probability to it, but we recognise
that life is all probabilities, but thats what reasonable
doubt it all about.
I think that those two quotes (modified as I understand them) are consistent. They are also not entirely Bayesian but I would prefer to be in a court of law than a court of probability.
I suppose you could weasel in some sort of consistency about the wording ... something like "You cannot properly say there is a 25 percent chance that something has happened, but you can properly say you believe there is a 25 percent chance that something has happened." OK, fine, but what's the difference? You still assign a percent probability to the chance that something happened, and you still rule on the basis of those beliefs. Or do you? (It's not clear to me from those quotes.)