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Re:There's No Protection In High Ports by AnthonyMouse on Sunday February 17, 2013 @01:49PM (#5236199)
>As I've argued elsewhere, obscuring your login service via non-standard ports or even a requirement to try several ports in sequence really only buys you security equivalent to lengthening your password by two characters per port. After all, TCP and UDP port numbers are limited to 65536 distinct values, within the scope of a 16-bit value. Moving your service to a non-standard port means that the would-be intruder has to guess a two-byte value. Introducing a sequence of ports buys you the added obscurity of two bytes per port.

It needs to be pointed out that it is actually worse than that. Guessing a password is O(2^n) on the length of the password. Making the attacker guess a random m bit value before starting to guess passwords is O(2^m + 2^n). To put numbers behind this, a password with 32 bits of entropy has ~4 billion possible combinations, 16 bits of random port + 32 bits of password has 65536 + ~4 billion possible combinations (also known as ~4 billion), while a 34 bit password would have ~16 billion possible combinations.

Re:There's No Protection In High Ports by casca on Sunday February 17, 2013 @04:42PM (#5236851)
It's true that just changing the port doesn't add much to protect against brute-force attacks, but it's not the full story. Many automatic scanners try port 22 and then give up for that host. I've found that changing the port means that I'm hit but far fewer scans.

One could also use port knocking. Using just a single port it would add the 16 bits of randomness making it 32 bits of extra randomness which is significant.

Another advantage of using a different port is that it's often quite easy to detect port scans against a host so an automated tool can easily just block the scanning IP. Slow scans exist but if someone is willing to take that amount of time then there's not much you can do to stop them from eventually finding your service.