Re:For sale: Trusted root SSL CA signing certificate
by adamcaudill on Saturday February 09, 2013 @08:16PM
(#5194947)
Based on what's been said here, and on twitter (i.e. https://twitter.com/rmhrisk/status/300351604715057154 ), doesn't it appear that they are in violation of that requirement? Unless contracts and audits meet the requirement for "cannot."
Re:For sale: Trusted root SSL CA signing certificate
by rmhrisk on Saturday February 09, 2013 @08:19PM
(#5194954)
The root programs all allow for technical and procedural controls to meet the this criteria. There are technical controls beyond name constraints as well.
Again GlobalSign's policies do not allow the use of certificates that chain to our roots to be used for MiTM purposes (or other malicious use cases for that matter) and we have controls in place that protect against such things occurring.
Re:For sale: Trusted root SSL CA signing certificate
by marshray on Saturday February 09, 2013 @08:42PM
(#5195021)
Perhaps if you described these technical controls in more detail we could reason about its security instead of by way of obscurity.
Re:For sale: Trusted root SSL CA signing certificate
by rmhrisk on Saturday February 09, 2013 @08:48PM
(#5195042)
They need to meet the same criteria we do, here are some starting points but its far from exaustive:
http://www.mozilla.org/projects/security/certs/policy/
http://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/3...
Re:For sale: Trusted root SSL CA signing certificate
by JoachimSchipper on Sunday February 10, 2013 @06:57AM
(#5196167)
This is very comforting. After all, it's not like any CA "trusted" under those programs ever did Bad Things; certainly, these programs loudly warned about DigiNotar, TrustWave and TURKTRUST.
Here you go: https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:Communications February 17, 2012 1) Subordinate CAs chaining to CAs in Mozilla’s root program cannot be used for MITM or “traffic management” of domain names or IPs that the certificate holder does not legitimately own or control, regardless of whether it is in a closed and controlled environment or not. Please review all of the subordinate CAs that chain up to your root certificates in NSS to make sure that they cannot be used in this way. Any existing subordinate CAs that can be used for that purpose must be revoked and any corresponding HSMs destroyed as soon as possible, but no later than April 27, 2012.
Note the word "cannnot" there. It's not "prohibited by contractual agreement", it's "destroy the HSMs containing the private keys".