However our policies have always been that those entities need to meet the same requirements (operationally, etc) as we do which includes not participating MiTMs with any key material associated with that PKI.
Those customers who do have such CAs are also (normally) subject contractual restrictions to what namespaces they can issue against and they are always subject to audits where we confirm their usage is consistent with those policies.
In the very rare cases where that is not the case they are audited to meet the exact requirements we meet - we almost never do this.
It’s a difficult problem as a whole, there are legitimate use cases that help secure the web and enable commerce that are best served by having publicly trusted certificates our goal as an industry is to find ways to address those needs while reducing the risk.
To that end when I joined GlobalSign a year ago (from Microsoft) one of the first things I did was started here to advocate the industries use of name constraints as a means to reduce risk for all parties involved in these scenarios.
Ryan
Are the nameConstraints extensions on these certs marked critical? I didn't know they could even be non-critical (one RFC says they can't) but 'agl says otherwise and would know.
When it comes to crypto and the level of trust that the entire world puts into this, this is the only definition of "MITM cert" that matters.
It's interesting that we bring this up, because it makes me now think that maybe the best way to jumpstart TACK is to implement it as a library that IOS programs can use.
Ryan
That said, if we're (a) in a universe where critical:true nameConstraints are enforced on the last couple versions of Safari, Chrome, Firefox and IE, and (b) you're only issuing critical:true nameConstraints certificates, it probably isn't worth being alarmist here.
In any case, thank you for commenting here. I had hoped to have a chance for once to join my fellow HN commenters in a rousing game of baying at the moon over the injustice of it all, but instead find myself amidst a carnival of X.509 learning. Hooray?
TACK can't get here fast enough!
Moving forward Name Constraints will be adopted (finally) which is a good thing. Today it is supported by the majority of devices on the internet and given how fast browsers update now it wont be too long until the extension can be marked critical.
On a semi-related note check out how many governments have their own roots : http://unmitigatedrisk.com/?p=181
Will you reissue them all (for free) once you decide to start marking new ones critical? Will you require all such entities get reissued certs? Can you contractually require that they destroy the old certificates?
Then there's the matter of how problematic OCSP is; even if you revoke the old ones, it may not matter.
Said migration would ave no cost from us on the customer, I can't speak to what the other CAs do.
Do any of your offerings provide customers with custody of an X.509 certificate that chains to a GlobalSign certificate that is trusted by any of IE, Mozilla, Chrome, or Safari where that X.509 certificate has CA:TRUE in its Basic Constraints?
By "custody" I mean that the private key corresponding to that certificate is held in some fashion on customer premises, regardless of the technical controls implemented in the device in which it's held.