A patient could have multiple identifiers that's only known to him/her.
Think a model like 1Password.
The last "meaty" one I attended was a local MIT Enterprise Forum featuring local healthcare IT professionals. The panel had a device startup, a personal healthcare portal, some consulting goons, and the CIO for a local HMO (she was the only one who made any sense).
I just attended a legislative action committee meeting for my state. Our elected reps touched on what was happening at the state level to implement ACA (aka Obamacare, mostly "meaningful use" stuff and patient eligibility, really basic stuff).
Every state now has a board of some sort for implementing their state and regional healthcare information exchanges per ACA. The meetings are public. That's probably a good way to find your local players.
It's been a few years since I lurked healthcare IT blogs. There might be some good ones to follow.
But it doesn't change the fact that HIPAA is just kabuki (for show).
I worked on some of the first RHIOs (regional health information exchanges) on the market. We all had yearly HIPAA training. All platitudes and very little actionable advice. As devs, we all had full access to millions of patients.
Accidental disclosure is inevitable. So many participants, so many systems, the weakest link and all that. We all figured it was a matter of time before something bad happened.
I care about privacy. A lot. I researched what's what, legal and technical. Because I want to do a good job. And I have skin in the game (my own medical history).
The month I started on the electronic medical records project, a local hospital had just settled for allowing 100,000s of complete patient records leak. (A stolen laptop.) So I contacted the lawyers on both sides. Verdict? Try harder next time.
Pretty much nothing has changed (improved) since. Except the disclosure requirements, I guess.
This is a long topic, so I'll just skip to the conclusion:
We will not, cannot protect patient privacy until we assign a universal unique identifier for every single person. This means something something akin to RealID.
To protect patient privacy, we need to encrypt the data. But that's not feasible without globally unique identifiers. Because patient demographic data is dirty and mismatched record can be fatal. So you have matching algorithms that have to look at the original plaintext. And the heuristics are wrong enough that the process requires human oversight.
If we (the USA) had unique identifiers, then we could transition to translucent database designs. That'd be very cool.
http://www.amazon.com/Translucent-Databases-Peter-Wayner/dp/...
About once a year, I go to a "future of healthcare IT" event. I desperately want to hear that patient privacy is being addressed. Hope springs eternal. Mostly, no one knows what I'm talking about. Until you've worked on the systems and tried to actually implement privacy safeguards, people just don't grok the problem domain, and continue to believe it's a trivially solvable problem.