News for hackers. Stuff that matters.
Re:Limiting passwords to 12 characters is "secure enough" by eru on Friday February 01, 2013 @02:05AM (#5149629)
> Get a whole heap of passwords from random.org.

I suggest /dev/random or /dev/urandom, as it doesn't involve a third-party. You can xor with data from random.org, if that makes you feel better.

> Forget the password to the encrypted text file? Throw your life away and start a new identity.

Just print out the plaintext of your password text file, and store the piece of paper somewhere reasonably secure. I say `reasonably' because if someone were to gain physical access to your computer, they could install a keyboard logger anyway.

Re:Limiting passwords to 12 characters is "secure enough" by eksith on Friday February 01, 2013 @02:50AM (#5149737)
I'm not too fond of printing out passwords. If I forget, and I'm extremely forgetful, that's just a disaster waiting to happen. I know my brain and I know it can't be trusted with physical security. Also, I'd rather use /dev/urandom instead of simply /dev/random.

Considering my aversion to using a stranger's computer to login to my accounts and the fact that I never use an open WiFi connection for anything without Tor, I'm much happier using a local copy of the encrypted file or at the very least a secure offline mirror(s) to download a copy of the encrypted file if I don't have it handy.

Re:Limiting passwords to 12 characters is "secure enough" by TheNewAndy on Friday February 01, 2013 @03:41AM (#5149857)
Not really the issue, but /dev/urandom is weaker than /dev/random, it is urandom which never blocks (try "hd /dev/random" and note that it blocks, then jiggle your mouse a bit and it will come back to life)
Re:Limiting passwords to 12 characters is "secure enough" by KMag on Friday February 01, 2013 @10:32AM (#5151243)
This is true on some systems, but not others. On FreeBSD (and OSX, as I remember) /dev/random and /dev/urandom act identically. The underlying CSPRNG, Yarrow, is designed to recover from a compromised state vector. Unfortunately, Yarrow relies on entropy estimates to time its re-seeding.

I've said it before: entropy estimates are a fiction. Ideally, /dev/random and /dev/urandom would both offer non-blocking access to an underlying Fortuna implementation (using a cryptographic hash function instead of a cipher, to avoid export/import restrictions).