Paul Krugman, for example, proposed that big banks like Citibank provide value by having a huge service network, and therefore he's skeptical of breaking up banks. Which is true--Citibank's size is the primary (and probably only) reason I'm a Citibank customer. But the unstated assumption that there must necessarily a 1:1 ratio of Too-Big-To-Fail bunches of assets to bank service networks is baffling to me.
There seems to be a TBTF blind spot in the sphere of wide-area economic and financial knowledge; that is just one example. The solution is always "more regulation", or occasionally, "better regulation" with the implication that everything is the government's fault.
I think they're quite familiar with the idea and have caught onto it long ago; they just don't want to be misrepresented as advocating a government takeover of the finance industry or as communists or whatever. It's not so much that they favor large institutions, as they're trying be moderate and consider both sides of the argument.
By contrast, read the editorial pages or the comment sections of the Wall Street Journal, in which Obama is regularly characterized as a Marxist ideologue and worse, and any sort of regulation or disciplinary action against the financial services sector is characterized a shakedown, at best. If the government actually proposed carving up the banks there would be (even more) howls for his impeachment. Much as only Nixon could go to China, a reset of the financial sector could only come from some prominent Republican, and a fiscally hawkish one at that.
I'm a member of a two-branch credit union, but I get to use a fairly extensive service network through the Credit Union Service Center system, where a large number of small institutions share the customer-service side of their operations. In the SF bay area, I get full service from any of the several dozen branches of Patelco and USE, plus several smaller CUs.
Banks that are too big to fail are too big to be allowed to exist. Government protection only for the commercial/retail part is an obvious but insufficient requirement.
[1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Primary_dealer [2] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Market_maker [3] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bid-offer_spread
When big banks make money by taking crazy risks, they earned every penny and how DARE we try to tax or regulate them. When they lose money by taking risks, we need to bail them out for the good of the free world and how DARE we ask to be paid back. Small banks do not have this attitude.
If they were smaller the collateral damage is smaller and wind up manageable. There are real reasons for not letting big banks fail so we need to avoid them getting that big and complicated so they can be allowed to fail.
This should be mitigated by the fact that shareholders will lose value, even in the event of a taxpayer rescue. Meaning, a bailout isn't a good insurance policy for a shareholder because they lose anyway. But that fear of a bailout doesn't seem to limit the risk appetite as I'd expect.
I think it's because regulation and control hasn't made this type of risk transparent to the shareholder. The shareholder isn't calling for these types of regulations because of fear the regulation would be overbearing and hurt profitability.
Often, over regulation is a shortsighted concern that allows a company to take on more risk than an investor would typically allow for (at existing valuations).
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principal%E2%80%93agent_problem
More simply:
Taxpayers are suckers
Lenders are suckers
Shareholders are suckers
Managers and traders, not suckers.
2) the other 3 (Goldman, Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch) would have failed after Lehman, the entire financial system had to be backstopped by the government. (If you look beyond pure securities firms, the largest insurance company (AIG) failed as well as the largest bank (Citibank - it effectively got nationalized and shareholders were wiped out, look at a stock price chart (http://finance.yahoo.com/q/bc?s=C&t=my&l=off&z=l...)
The lesson learned is that the financial system can't survive a failure like Lehman without a government backstop.
So, pick your poison, either 1) permanent government backstop and some regulation to go with, it, ie don't let bankers run leveraged hedge funds on the public dime, take all the profits in good times and stick taxpayers with the bill when it goes south.
Or 2) smaller banks that can fail without taking the whole system down.
Let the banks go bust by all means, but let's also recognize that government regulation/incentives ($440B from Fannie Mae!) was a large part of what got us into this mess.
http://articles.cnn.com/2002-06-17/politics/bush.minority.ho...
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and the federal Home Loan Banks --
the government-sponsored corporations that handle home
mortgages -- will increase their commitment to minority
markets by more than $440 billion, Bush said.
Under one of the initiatives launched by Freddie Mac,
consumers with poor credit will be able to obtain mortgages
with interest rates that automatically decline after a
period of consistent payments, he added.
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/08/02/opinion/dubya-s-double-dip... To fight this recession the Fed needs more than a snapback;
it needs soaring household spending to offset moribund
business investment. And to do that, as Paul McCulley of
Pimco put it, Alan Greenspan needs to create a housing
bubble to replace the Nasdaq bubble.
Paul Krugman, 2002It's the smaller banks that struggled the most and continue to do so: http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jul/06/business/la-fi-banks...
of course there are always some people who believe whatever they want to believe.
not sure what you're advocating...in the Great Depression banks failed, the depositors lost all their savings, triggering runs on other banks, etc., hence the name Great Depression. so that wasn't a very sound policy.
on the other hand a government backstop for a bunch of traders making giant risky bets with depositors' money so heads they win, tails we lose, is not a sound policy either.
somewhere there's a reasonable medium, collectively safeguard the payments system and bank deposits, without giving banks carte blanche to use depositors' money and government backup to make risky bets.
and don't let banks get so big that it's both an administrative nightmare to shut one down, and they have enough political power to thwart shutdowns and effective regulation.
However, just limit the amount of Federal Deposit Insurance that can be issued to one entity, if we can't figure out what they're doing.
>market discipline has worked to keep smaller institutions on the straight and narrow, it has been ineffective with megabanks
>market participants have proved [in]effective in monitoring risks at these [huge banks].
>They know they will be protected by a taxpayer rescue should a large institution teeter.
How is this not obvious to everyone involved?