[Edit: On re-reading, I think I misunderstood this, and the comment beneath this one is substantially correct regarding them bundling OpenSSH. I still think this is substantially more attack surface than however you're consuming OpenSSH code currently.]
Secure Shell is a Chrome Application that combines the "ssh" command (see http://openssh.org/ for details) ported to NativeClient with the "hterm" terminal emulator to provide a secure shell client for the Chrome browser.
http://git.chromium.org/gitweb/?p=chromiumos/platform/assets...
I'm not familiar enough with the multiple sandboxing levels of Chrome to judge the risks of one malicious website accessing the memory of the Secure Shell extension. I guess you have a point, although I would expect the "each tab in a separate process" model to mitigate this concern?
Client-side exploits in SSH clients have happened before[1]. The scope of such exploits is arguably reduced when running a sand-boxed application in a browser compared to a regular application on the local machine.
That being said, I agree with your general point that using a browser as an SSH terminal dramatically increases the attack surface, compared to a small dedicated client.
[1] http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2005-0467
Multiple integer overflows in the (1) sftp_pkt_getstring and (2) fxp_readdir_recv functions in the PSFTP and PSCP clients for PuTTY 0.56, and possibly earlier versions, allow remote malicious web sites to execute arbitrary code via SFTP responses that corrupt the heap after insufficient memory has been allocated.