Basically, I'm not a materialist. (Which was a widely held position in philosophy across millennia and across cultures up until just recently. I treat consciousness as fundamental, not the material universe . Thus 'conjuring intelligence' into machines is simply not possible.
BTW, machine learning is a totally valid concept from where I stand. But it's 'dumb' learning.
Like the people who got certain brain injury and their whole persona changed or certain capabilites were lost?
There also research papers that certain brain structures have emerged in ML models.
At any rate, sure, not being at odds with the existence of consciousness might be a trait of the more reasonable strands of materialism (if there's even such a thing), but they will always see it as emergent/derivative and often even epiphenomenal, otherwise they wouldn't be materialist stances.
So am not sure where you see the logical misstep here, but am happy to hear. The point of the previous comment is that framing an ontology whose primitive is C, is in no way "esoteric", term that is usually used in contraposition with "rational". Taking C as epistemologically or even ontologically prior is the rational stance, not only on accounts of parsimony.
Or on a technical note because certain brain structures etc. might not exist in an LLM and stuff like a default mode network and sensory input and a world to move in, is missing?