It’s ass backwards.
The entire process is about compliance, the actual security is totally ignored.
One vendor I spoke to was scouring eBay for old Juniper VPN appliances that still had some ancient firmware that could no longer be “downgraded to” on new ones.
Notably, this old firmware included the back door used by the Chinese government that was trivially exploitable! https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dual_EC_DRBG
Why that version!?
“Because that specific point release was certified years ago, and they never updated the certification subsequently.” was the almost verbatim explanation!
It’s insane, but that’s how government drones think. You can’t snap them out of it, they’re unable to comprehend any other way of doing things.
Details like “security is a treadmill, you have to keep moving” just doesn’t compute.
I'm pretty sure they were calling that network the NSANet back then; I assume it's gone through many generations of upgrade since then. I don't remember much about them as a customer, except that (a) we weren't supposed to mention their name, and (b) they were running a horribly old version of the switch firmware. My understanding was that they literally tested stuff for years before deploying it.
It was a long time ago, and I was just a summer hire, so I could have this wrong; in addition things may have changed in the intervening 40 years.