> My consciousness, my sense of self continues uninterrupted.

That's the part I directly dispute.

I don't dispute that a computer could become conscious, but I'm not convinced you could transfer your consciousness to a machine. If a brain scan copied your brain, that would not be the same consciousness that you have now. It would be like having a twin, and twins don't share a consciousness.

Exactly this. Personally I would dispute a computer becoming conscious, but it's inconsequential to the argument. Even if it does become conscious, that consciousnesses is not you. You haven't transferred anything. You still die, and then have a chatbot in your likeness.

For a technical issue I'd also add that this entire thing becoming increasingly absurd given advances in understanding of human biology. Discoveries like the gut-brain axis emphasize that the concept of brains in a shell is mostly naive. Your body and your brain are completely interdependent to create 'you'.

But again I think the objections around consciousness or possibility are completely inconsequential (if not also strong arguments in their own right). Even if we accept every single point and desired outcome, you still die.

I suppose parent comment is addressing the version of you that doesn't wake up inside a computer. If a biological vetsion of you exists, then that version won't be the same instance as the one in the machine. There will be two copies.

Machine-you would no doubt be thrilled. How does bio-you cope with not being made immortal? If your answer is "It doesn't matter, throw the original in the trash" is that murder or suicide?