News for hackers. Stuff that matters.
Re:I'm not a fan of Deno's security model (2024) by ch4s3 on Sunday November 08, 2026 @04:32PM (#50417529)
This is what I do by setting caps at compile time, they aren’t a runtime feature. You either compile out code without a grant or it errors.
Re:I'm not a fan of Deno's security model (2024) by sieve on Sunday November 08, 2026 @05:35PM (#50418178)
How will you allow permissions for a `ls` style tool? I want to be able to do `ls /etc`.
Re:I'm not a fan of Deno's security model (2024) by ch4s3 on Sunday November 08, 2026 @06:27PM (#50418813)
Probably on a directory read basis. I’d need to give it more thought.

Thanks for the thoughtful question!

Re:I'm not a fan of Deno's security model (2024) by amluto on Sunday November 08, 2026 @07:00PM (#50419129)
The tool parses its command line, claims the capabilities it needs, drops everything else, then runs.

Or the language it’s written in allows writing a function that takes a recursive enumerate capability on a directory plus a write capability to stdout.

A while back I sent a brain dump email to LKML about “path capabilities”. Maybe I’ll try to implement it.

Re:I'm not a fan of Deno's security model (2024) by sieve on Sunday November 08, 2026 @09:56PM (#50420458)
My current design idea lets the runtime collect all the requests till the application locks its set of demands. This entire set is presented to the user who can then approve/reject/approve-always

The runtime maintains state in the config directory so that approve-always works for `(hash(ls), dir_read(/etc))` without producing that question during the next `ls /etc`