Re:I'm not a fan of Deno's security model (2024)
by ch4s3 on Sunday November 08, 2026 @04:32PM
(#50417529)
This is what I do by setting caps at compile time, they aren’t a runtime feature. You either compile out code without a grant or it errors.
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Re:I'm not a fan of Deno's security model (2024)
by sieve on Sunday November 08, 2026 @05:35PM
(#50418178)
How will you allow permissions for a `ls` style tool? I want to be able to do `ls /etc`.
Re:I'm not a fan of Deno's security model (2024)
by ch4s3 on Sunday November 08, 2026 @06:27PM
(#50418813)
Probably on a directory read basis. I’d need to give it more thought.
Thanks for the thoughtful question!
Re:I'm not a fan of Deno's security model (2024)
by amluto on Sunday November 08, 2026 @07:00PM
(#50419129)
The tool parses its command line, claims the capabilities it needs, drops everything else, then runs.
Or the language it’s written in allows writing a function that takes a recursive enumerate capability on a directory plus a write capability to stdout.
A while back I sent a brain dump email to LKML about “path capabilities”. Maybe I’ll try to implement it.
Re:I'm not a fan of Deno's security model (2024)
by sieve on Sunday November 08, 2026 @09:56PM
(#50420458)
My current design idea lets the runtime collect all the requests till the application locks its set of demands. This entire set is presented to the user who can then approve/reject/approve-always
The runtime maintains state in the config directory so that approve-always works for `(hash(ls), dir_read(/etc))` without producing that question during the next `ls /etc`