It mostly stops honest mistakes, because those do happen, especially when the <prompting> might not have been perfect either.

You do have a bit of a point, though: I’ve run several models in sandboxes with --dangerously-skip-permissions for months; in the full expectation that I'd need to replace a sandbox once in a while. But so far none of the sandboxes have trashed themselves, yet. knock on wood

Auto mode seems like a lighter-weight version of that: fewer local resources, and it can run on the metal if you need cc to help with system work.

That is not my experience. They attempt to nuke my containers quite frequently. I run regex on all their tool calls and stop them from doing certain things, its the only thing that prevents them from removing their home directory at some point.

This isnt even the main concern with dangerously skip all permission though. There are many. What happens when they get prompt injected on a web page and send someone all their privileged information because you give them free access to the internet.

Using llms like this is dangerous. They will ruin your day eventually.

I've been running Codex for many weeks in the Full access mode, since their Auto mode was useless in the sense that it blocks benign commands frequently.

No data loss has occurred.

Nowadays I use Claude, where the Auto mode works.

All SOTA models will still try to delete its home directory. I have a plugin that prevents things like this and it gets triggered more than you'd think, despite having hook instructions on every request not do do certain things. It will also try to find ways around its permissions, quite cunningly.

You can not trust that they're RL'd to be safe. Even if it only happens 99.80% of the time (its more than that) it will eventually happen.

Less severe actions will happen even more often. People using llms with their native browser profiles are getting farmed, hard.

Llms are highly dangerous in terms of security, but they're being marketed as highly intelligent tools that everyone should use. Its really mind blowing.

> People using llms with their native browser profiles are getting farmed, hard.

Got any references for the prevalence of this, even links to anecdotal reports?

Reading the reviews on the chrome store for the extension [0], I haven't found a single report of someone who was prompt injected, just a bunch of "anthropic's subscription is expensive" or "it doesn't work", but no "it stole my bank account".

[0]: https://chromewebstore.google.com/detail/claude/fcoeoabgfene...

I have no idea how the extension works, and Im not talking about the extension. Im talking about browser use broadly, and most people are not using the extension, there are a thousand other solutions.

However, Anthropic is one of the only labs who does a decent job at making models that recognize prompt injection attempts (but not completely immune) however Im speaking about giving llms in general access to your browser broadly.

I just know through my own experiments that it is quite easy to prompt inject an llm operating a browser and get it to send secrets. Using the extension might be safer idk, Om not risking it.

Llms are a security nightmare when connected to the web.

I have a website where I experiment with this. Although Ive stopped baiting llms into doing reckless things.

Killai.now <--(dont use this, its a WIP) Killai.now/poison/about Killai.noe/propaganda/about