News for hackers. Stuff that matters.

A comment on Motorola Signature 27 with GrapheneOS support. Parent comment

Re:Motorola Signature 27 with GrapheneOS support by grapheneos on Thursday November 05, 2026 @06:22PM (#50385989)
That's not an inconsistency but rather the only way to reliably wipe user data. It would be completely broken to attempt wiping data by zeroing the userdata partition. That wouldn't get rid of all the data from the SSD even with secure erase commands for overwriting it.

A modern SSD has both static and dynamic wear leveling. An SSD redirects writes to the free blocks with the least wear and also moves around used blocks to free up the least heavily written parts of the storage. An SSD with a proper whole drive secure erase implements it by securely wiping keys.

[ Parent | on HN ]
Re:Motorola Signature 27 with GrapheneOS support by yaro330 on Thursday November 05, 2026 @06:25PM (#50386030)
I understand all of this. But wiping means what it does, and "removing the keys of an encrypted partition" is not the same. Please be more forthcoming in the documentation.

Sure Daniel

[ Parent | on HN ]
Re:Motorola Signature 27 with GrapheneOS support by winterguy on Thursday November 05, 2026 @07:04PM (#50386374)
This is just pedantic and dishonest. 'Wiping data' as a concept very much so includes cryptographically scrambling it and losing the key.
[ Parent | on HN ]
Re:Motorola Signature 27 with GrapheneOS support by rtaskw3 on Friday November 06, 2026 @12:22PM (#50395334)
No, you are redefining "wipe". A copy of the key could be stored in malicious hardware, ready for the authorities to copy.

The trust you people put in Google and Motorola is surprising.

[ Parent | on HN ]