Local privilege escalation vulnerabilities in Linux

Re:Local privilege escalation vulnerabilities in Linux by est31 on Wednesday November 04, 2026 @09:21PM (#50374301)

That's a fair question, and actually one I ask myself too.

AI doesn't give a strong guarantee that things work though, while Rust gives a much stronger (not absolute) guarantee.

But maybe the way of the future is to auto-generate proofs that the code is memory safe. The C code and the AI generated proofs could live separately and so it would need less maintainer buy-in.

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Re:Local privilege escalation vulnerabilities in Linux by imtringued on Thursday November 05, 2026 @08:50AM (#50379049)

I'm thinking a language change isn't enough... At least not for a kernel.

There has to be a pseudo userspace type of way to build a kernel driver. Basically, user space programs are fine, but kernel drivers need their own form of encapsulation without expensive context switches.

Something like memory encryption or memory access bounds. During the handoff you do not change the address space, you just restrict access to a subset of the kernel memory.

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