News for hackers. Stuff that matters.
Re:Spain train crash: What we know after two trains crashed ... by busywaiting on Thursday October 29, 2026 @01:57PM (#50293247)
Trains can't change lanes without warning like a Nissan Altima on the Dan Ryan Expressway. The only way a train can move from one track to an adjacent track -- or get on the first track in the first place -- is if switches are set to allow the train onto that track. And on any modern high-speed line, those switches are centrally controlled by dispatch.

Keeping track of which parallel track a train was on automatically was a solved problem a hundred years ago, using relays and lights and hard-wired logic. Adding computers and GPS greatly increases the precision with which dispatch knows position and speed along the track, but knowing which track has not changed in the last century.

Re:Spain train crash: What we know after two trains crashed ... by pixl97 on Thursday October 29, 2026 @02:42PM (#50293918)
>Trains can't change lanes without warning

Oh, they can, but it's usually a very traumatic event.

Re:Spain train crash: What we know after two trains crashed ... by 1718627440 on Thursday October 29, 2026 @04:56PM (#50295822)
Basically what was the case with the previous accident in Spain.
Re:Spain train crash: What we know after two trains crashed ... by iggldiggl on Thursday October 29, 2026 @06:01PM (#50296776)
Yes, but as long as the central signalling system is working, it already knows where the train is, with no need to involve GPS. (And where modern signalling and train protection systems need increased precision as compared to the granularity of track circuits/axle counter sections, the solution usually involves a combination of on-train odometry plus track balises at occasional intervals in order to reset any inaccuracies that might have accumulated.)

What we're talking about here is some sort of TCAS-equivalent for the case where the central signalling is down – while it's easy to accurately localise trains with the aid of a central signalling system that authoritatively knows about the infrastructure layout, it's quite more difficult when you're trying to do the same thing in a decentralised, train-local fashion.

Re:Spain train crash: What we know after two trains crashed ... by 1718627440 on Thursday October 29, 2026 @06:03PM (#50296802)
Yep, that's what I was trying to convey as well. There also seems to be RCAS, but it sounds like a newly invented system. https://www.dlr.de/en/kn/research-transfer/projects/next-gen...
Re:Spain train crash: What we know after two trains crashed ... by iggldiggl on Thursday October 29, 2026 @06:19PM (#50297001)
And as of now, I suppose that RCAS (or RCAS-like systems) is best suited for (especially minor) single track branch lines that don't currently have a full-scale signalling system already up-and-running, but instead still rely on "Timetable & Train Order" and similar systems.

Single track means that at least outside of stations, collisions can be reliably identified without much danger of false positives (and for station areas you can just institute a blanket speed limit to compensate for the gap in RCAS coverage, which might not even be any lower than the speed limit required for traversing diverging/spring-operated/hand-operated points there anyway), and no already existing full-scale signalling system means that RCAS actually provides a significant safety benefit and is therefore likely worthwhile from a cost-benefit-analysis point of view, too, if you're actually regularly operating multiple trains simultaneously on that kind of infrastructure.

Whereas on multi-track mainline railways avoiding false positives is much harder and normally you should already have proper signalling and train protection systems in place anyway, so the additional safety benefits of RCAS would be much more marginal.