This probably makes your use case somewhat unusual...
> I actually do have multiple Yubikeys, one of which is stored away.
...and this probably puts you in the 0.0001th or so percentile of users. It's really a great security strategy if you can pull it off, but practically almost nobody can.
My feeling would be that "normal people" can always recover their accounts from their main email, which makes the main email the only "important" account. So having a Yubikey always plugged in is a "nice convenience".
Now to be honest, I would expect that "normal people" are absolutely fine with passkeys on their smartphone, and don't consider it a "trap".
I would just expect that people who consider it a trap are able to use a Yubikey the way I do.
I think the people most likely to be hurt by it being a trap are unfortunately those least likely to be able to juggle multiple Yubikeys.
- Relying on emails for account recovery prevents creation of anonymous accounts.
- Have you ever lost your "convenience yubikey"? People underestimate how painful mass account recovery can be.
- The cost of 3 yubikeys can be substantial for some demographics.
- Important accounts are not properly backed up until you drive to your safe. That can be many days for a bank deposit box, or even longer if you're traveling.
Overall that's a lot of compromises for what should have been just "put this recovery key/password in a safe and forget about it until needed", if the protocol was better. And definitely not something that can be widely recommended.
Surely that is also impacted by:
> Important accounts are not properly backed up until you drive to your safe. That can be many days for a bank deposit box, or even longer if you're traveling.
I wrote a proposal almost a decade ago: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/343318317_Privacy-a...
The problem is that the protocol prevents you from adding a (additional) key you don't currently control. This is what crote was referencing here:
> Passkeys have to be online to enroll additional keys, so any kind of software or smartphone solution is going to depend completely on cloud sync.
Would be cool if I could do that with FIDO2!
This is true, it's possible to have just the verification information present without the key itself.
However, a part of almost every credential enrollment process is verification that the credential is usable and controlled by the enrolling party.
For passwords it's simply "please type the password again", for TOTP it's generating the next number, for email/SMS it's entering a code sent to that address, so for adding a public key, it should include some way of verifying that you control the private key associated with that public key. It's hard to do that without having the private key available.
Those are strings typed by humans and frequent victims of typos, so the need is much higher. But you're right that it's still useful to prevent a user from accidentally using a bad key, or from selecting a maliciously formatted public key to mess with the protocol. I just don't think these benefits outweigh the lost ability of making offline backups.
Maybe allowing registration of multiple keys, but only requiring proof of possession of one key would be a good compromise.
Prove that you possess one key, and sign the other public keys with that key you possess? That would prove that you possess the public keys, wouldn't it?
I guess my concern would be that I have the public key to my backup Yubikey on my computer, I enroll it everywhere but I never actually use the Yubikey because it is stored in a vault at the bank. Nothing prevents an attacker from replacing my public key with theirs, and suddenly I'm enrolling them everywhere without ever noticing.
Or am I missing something?
That's a clever attack and it indeed seems viable.
In my proposed protocol the public recovery key defines a "profile", and the account "username" is generated based on this key plus the service domain. So an attacker replacing this key would be reflected in the app as a completely new profile, and cause all your logins to fail. Not a perfect mitigation, but something.
I would be happy with that already, but I think even better solutions might exist.
Another issue of using one "master recovery keypair" naively with passkeys, is that you have to register the same recovery public key on every service, losing your pseudonymity. In my protocol that's not a problem because the recovery key pair is used for decryption, not signature.
(I'm not trying to advertise my protocol because I never figured out a good way to do multi-device sync without trusting the cloud or having bad ergonomics)
> Nothing prevents an attacker [...]
I mean, hopefully the device security does! That's as bad as someone adding a hidden forwarding rule to your email account, or adding a new device to your password manager cloud sync.
> so a Yubikey passkey is very quickly a single-point-of-failure
It is a single point of failure when there is one. As soon as you use two, then it's not a single point a failure anymore, is it?
The counter argument I usually read is: "Yeah but it is not practical, because you need 3 yubikeys: the first 2 with you, that you enroll everywhere, and one in a safe. And every time you add a new passkey, you need to go get the one in the safe, replace it by another one, and enroll the one of the safe. You can't spend your life driving between your desk and your safe".
But I have been using multiple Yubikeys for... 8 years now I think? I don't remember the last time I enrolled and important key. Sure, once in a while I add a website, and it is a bit annoying to have to enroll the other Yubikeys at a different time. But it really doesn't happen that often, and anyway most of those websites allow me to recover my account with my email. So it is actually practical to have a "convenience yubikey" for websites that don't matter so much, and in case this Yubikey dies... well those websites were not so important, and anyway I can recover from my email.
The difference for the important websites (and really, I don't think I have really important websites in my life that don't allow me to recover by going in person with my ID, but for the sake of the argument) is that I actually do have multiple Yubikeys, one of which is stored away.
Whereas the master password of my Bitwarden account is a single point of failure, and the security of my online Bitwarden account is as well.