News for hackers. Stuff that matters.
Re:Rethinking Passwords by pixl97 on Tuesday January 01, 2013 @01:40PM (#4993413)
Most sites suck because they want seemingly random passwords that are hard for people to remember. Most sites seem deathly afraid of spaces too and want relatively short passwords.

While many sites would think this is a good password "x5tRwz3m" Length: 8 Strength: Weak. Entropy: 36 bits. Charset Size: 62 characters Is impossible for me to remember. A easy to remember mixed (seemly, but not random) password like that is much easier to generate and use in a off-line dictionary attack.

"I like Microsoft's login page." Length: 30 Strength: Very Strong. Entropy: 147.3 bits Charset Size: 73 characters

is a sentence and people are pretty good at remembering them.

Add in a tiny bit of complexity "I like M?icrosoft's login p!age."

Length: 32 Strength: Very Strong. Entropy: 163.5 bits. Charset Size: 83 characters.

It is exceptionally unlikely that a cracking attempt will reveal that password and that some other type of flaw will be needed to reveal the password or gain access to the account.

Re:Rethinking Passwords by dchest on Tuesday January 01, 2013 @02:48PM (#4993678)
What did you use to calculate entropy? 147.3 bits for "I like Microsoft's login page."? Looks highly unlikely that a proper sentence consisting of 5 dictionary words has 147.3 bits of entropy. For comparison, a truly random string of 30 characters from 73 charset has ~185 bits.
Re:Rethinking Passwords by pixl97 on Tuesday January 01, 2013 @02:57PM (#4993714)
Re:Rethinking Passwords by dchest on Tuesday January 01, 2013 @03:02PM (#4993737)
Yeah, password strength estimators are often wrong.
Re:Rethinking Passwords by beala on Tuesday January 01, 2013 @02:53PM (#4993698)
How did you find the entropy of these passwords? By my calculations 8 random characters from a set of 62 is 47.6 bits, not 36. (log(2,62)* 8 = 47.6) On a logarithmic scale, this is a huge difference.

For the passphrase, 30 characters chosen from 73 is 185.7 bits (log(2,73)* 30). Even this isn't correct though, because the characters aren't randomly chosen. As the author says: "Not so for human-created passwords, where a sea of associations and language rules greatly reduces the search space." In other words, knowing that the first word is "I" limits the possibilities for the next word, and so on.

Re:Rethinking Passwords by pixl97 on Tuesday January 01, 2013 @03:10PM (#4993776)
The site I used was http://rumkin.com/tools/password/passchk.php

How would an attacker know what the first letter is? Yes an attacker can guess if sentence passwords are used that (a|A),(the|The),and (i|I) would be very common starters but after that the bigger search space complicates things.

https://www.grc.com/haystack.htm

Read the sections on entropy and padding. Just using sentences alone does present attackers the ability to use an encyclopedia attack, but a few randomly placed symbols (padding) turns the endeavor back in to an exhaustive search.

Re:Rethinking Passwords by beala on Tuesday January 01, 2013 @03:28PM (#4993844)
An attacker might be looking over your shoulder, and see the first characters of your password.

Or he might read HN, and see that your preferred passphrase method is composed of english sentences with common substitutions.

Maybe a website you're using leaks its password DB, and your "padding method" is exposed, reducing the search space back to what it was before the padding. I'm going to have to disagree with GRC here. "D0g.........." is a very bad password, especially if you use ".........." as your padding on every website.

Even without this, common substitutions like '3' for 'e' or '!' or 'i' are accounted for in everything but the most naive cracking tools.

Perhaps less likely, a timing attack in the auth system exposes the first few characters of your password, but not the rest.

Why put up with these issues, when something like xkcd's 4 random words works well, is easy to remember and type, and calculates entropy in a uncontroversial way?

Re:Rethinking Passwords by sp332 on Tuesday January 01, 2013 @04:27PM (#4994065)
Randomly chosen letters have fairly high entropy, about 4 or 5 bits per character. Written English has much, much lower entropy, generally around 1 bit per character. You can see this if you compress written text. Most compressors on normal English will get to 12-15% of the original size.
Re:Rethinking Passwords by DanBC on Tuesday January 01, 2013 @07:14PM (#4994622)
A diceware passphrase is much more secure than a regular English sentence.

(http://world.std.com/~reinhold/diceware.html)

And substituting some symbols for letters doesn't add much security. Depending on the mode of attack there are precomputed sentences with a variety of substitution.

Be careful with GRC. Some people don't have a high opinion of his analyses:

(http://radsoft.net/news/roundups/grc/20060119,00.shtml)

Re:Rethinking Passwords by e12e on Tuesday January 01, 2013 @06:24PM (#4994454)
Even allowing a very generous 2 bits of entropy per letter, that is still just 60 bits worth, not over a hundred bits. Keep in mind that Shannon estimated the entropy of English text to be from 0.6 to 1.5 -- So 147.3 bits for any sentence from natural language seems awfully high.

The actual randomness of such a password is a factor when using some intelligent means to walk the keys pace, such as Markov chains.