A few references to widespread bootkits:
http://www.chmag.in/article/sep2011/rootkits-are-back-boot-i...
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2010/11/16/tdl_rootkit_does_64_...
http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9217953/Rootkit_infec...
Except for the boot signature, all of these could have been successfully implemented in the past and prevented everything you reference -- how on earth would an internet virus update the kernel or boot unless the kernel let it? but that wasn't the case.
There is no reason that secure boot would help in this respect.
If it gets to the point that secure boot is what saved you, then there was already a series of fairly disturbing errors. Layered security is good, but if it is really needed in a common case to this extent... what the hell is going wrong?
The way I see it, secure boot is like SSL, it stands as the last resort before giving up complete control.
This seems to like either a protection against a hyper-paranoid threat, or a bandaid on a larger problem.
How many security incidents is secure boot actually projected to prevent?