Re:Plugin4Shell – Zero Click RCE Vulnerability found in top ...
by SahAssar on Thursday September 17, 2026 @05:45PM
(#49747025)
This sounds very AI written and buries the lede, but my understanding is if you control the repo in a way that you can set the default branch state for a git repo and get a victim to install a plugin with the same git sha as that branch state you can RCE them?
Pretty bad for a package manager, but this seems like something I would unfortunately expect from a harness/agent.
Re:Plugin4Shell – Zero Click RCE Vulnerability found in top ...
by gdor80 on Friday September 18, 2026 @02:51AM
(#49750921)
It’s worse than that.
A user installs a completely safe plugin through a marketplace, the marketplace pins a vetted commit for the plugin, trusting it is safe and will stay safe.
If the “safe” plugin’s repo is controlled by an attacker - he can now set the default branch to a malicious version and anyone who installs will get the malicious version, exactly what the SHA pinning exists to protect from.
It gets worse when you consider agents auto-upgrade plugins from marketplaces. The attacker can have a new version, also benign, and open a PR to change the pinned SHA in the marketplace to the new version. Once the marketplace owner approves - do the said rug-pull and now anybody who installed the plugin gets an auto-upgrade to the malicious version.
It’s painful to read, regardless of the topic’s impact.
Pretty bad for a package manager, but this seems like something I would unfortunately expect from a harness/agent.
A user installs a completely safe plugin through a marketplace, the marketplace pins a vetted commit for the plugin, trusting it is safe and will stay safe. If the “safe” plugin’s repo is controlled by an attacker - he can now set the default branch to a malicious version and anyone who installs will get the malicious version, exactly what the SHA pinning exists to protect from.
It gets worse when you consider agents auto-upgrade plugins from marketplaces. The attacker can have a new version, also benign, and open a PR to change the pinned SHA in the marketplace to the new version. Once the marketplace owner approves - do the said rug-pull and now anybody who installed the plugin gets an auto-upgrade to the malicious version.