For some systems, I'd take getting rid of small outages -- I'll happily take an increased risk of a projected 15 minute loss of heart function becoming a >60 minute loss of heart function if it also eliminates what would otherwise be a bunch of 5 minute losses of heart function, since even the 5 minute interruptions would be fatal.
(Or, for a better example, revolvers vs. semi-autos. A revolver generally is more reliable, but if it goes out of timing, it's basically doomed, whereas a semi-auto can jam or pieces can break, but a monkey can clear, and a trained monkey can fix.)
The top-level systems probably need to be able to deal with increased latency or timeouts, and properly handle retries and throttling of traffic.
If you have some HA failover setup going but your alternate is already being used more for load balancing than for failover, problems like this will occur.
(I used to work on failover drivers for a SAN).
All the failover problems I can think of since they moved to this architecture 4 years ago have been coordination problems where something undesired happened when transitioning from one member of a pair to another. In this case, network problems lead them to a state where both members of a pair thought they were the master.
I have seen facility-scale UPSes go bad, and sometimes in weird ways, but an order of magnitude less frequently than grid power.
I think we reached a crossover point where designing for facility-scale survivability vs. replicating facilities ceased to be worthwhile for most Internet applications sometime in the past 10 years. It doesn't really make sense to drop $2b on a ~100k sf datacenter like AboveNet used to do for e.g. 365 Main. There are still some systems where replication is a pain, but even for those, I think metro area replication shouldn't be that hard. Even just running 5km of fiber in a loop between a few buildings in the same town gets you a huge amount of resilience against most facility problems.