Re:Hackers Had a Live Feed of Every ID Verification Company ...
by maratc on Friday September 04, 2026 @09:02AM
(#49564024)
I've experienced this "solved problem" when visiting Germany during COVID. On every entrance to a mall there was somebody with a scanner device, and they only let you in if the scanner showed a green mark. I've been fully vaccinated (not EU) but my code didn't show a green mark on their scanner and I was promptly denied entry. The solution was to show them my German friend's code on my phone, this registered just fine, so I could enter anywhere.
So the whole "eID/CAs/ZKP/PKI" mumbo jumbo can be easily fooled by a gif file.
Re:Hackers Had a Live Feed of Every ID Verification Company ...
by benregenspan on Friday September 04, 2026 @09:43AM
(#49564548)
That part seems to qualify as an unsolved problem. But could anyone have taken the scanned data (or the GIF file) and used it to open a bank account in your friend's name? That seems like the main issue that is genuinely solved by correct implementation of this type of system.
Re:Hackers Had a Live Feed of Every ID Verification Company ...
by maratc on Friday September 04, 2026 @09:53AM
(#49564704)
Already today nobody can open a bank account in my name with just a picture of my passport, as the original would be required. My passport doesn't have any of the "eID/CAs/ZKP/PKI", so the question of "what exactly the addition of it solves" remains open.
My national ID card supposedly has some of it, the 17-year olds who want to pass as 18-year olds usually show a doctored gif file of their ID card, with a year of birth one or two years before the actual one; this works in ~98% of the cases.
Re:Hackers Had a Live Feed of Every ID Verification Company ...
by lbschenkel on Saturday September 05, 2026 @12:30PM
(#49578133)
Actually it does. Biometric passports (and IDs) have a chip which is read via NFC and the information the NFC provides is signed by a CA which is the government that issued the passport. ICAO compiles a database of public keys corresponding to each government (plus countries exchange their public keys via bilateral agreements). Unless somebody is doing purely visual inspection, any time a passport is scanned there's PKI involved to validate if the information is genuine.
Re:Hackers Had a Live Feed of Every ID Verification Company ...
by maratc on Saturday September 05, 2026 @02:47PM
(#49579465)
None of that applies to my (non-biometric) passport, and we were talking about banks that don't have the passport-reading equipment to begin with.
Re:Hackers Had a Live Feed of Every ID Verification Company ...
by pas on Friday September 04, 2026 @09:27AM
(#49564331)
yes, just as age verification can be fooled by an older friend who gets the check mark.
Re:Hackers Had a Live Feed of Every ID Verification Company ...
by maratc on Friday September 04, 2026 @09:44AM
(#49564569)
Reminds me of
If you think cryptography can solve your problem, you don’t understand your problem and you don’t understand cryptography.
(Bruce Schneier dug into origins of this here: https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2026/05/laurie-anders...)
Re:Hackers Had a Live Feed of Every ID Verification Company ...
by Nursie on Friday September 04, 2026 @12:29PM
(#49566836)
That’s not what the new schemes are about, and they aren’t going to be based on a qr code you can just copy, no.
If you’re genuinely interested, look into things like OpenID credentials systems, and similar standards like w3c verifiable credentials.
Re:Hackers Had a Live Feed of Every ID Verification Company ...
by grebc on Friday September 04, 2026 @10:14AM
(#49564964)
You’re conflating the real life need of ID, with trust in the organisation.
Sorry. Wrong.
Re:Hackers Had a Live Feed of Every ID Verification Company ...
by thayne on Friday September 04, 2026 @01:45PM
(#49567818)
If the scan also included a picture, that was signed with your private key, then it would be harder to spoof.
Re:Hackers Had a Live Feed of Every ID Verification Company ...
by fc417fc802 on Friday September 04, 2026 @04:37PM
(#49569922)
Not really, the attacker would just need a picture of you which he could then sign (since we're assuming here that he gained access to your key IIUC). That's a pretty low bar compared to the first step of gaining the key.
Plenty of European countries have an eID CAs and it works fine.