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Re:Play Store blocks AuroraStore, hurting GrapheneOS users by Borealid on Tuesday September 01, 2026 @02:37PM (#49526110)
They're both security, just security "against" different things. Graphene frequently fails to clearly describe the threat model when calling something "more secure".

For example, let's say hypothetically I want to be secure against the threat of Google pushing a targeted update to my phone that runs malicious code. Turning on automatic software updates from Google would make me vulnerable to that threat. Using MicroG instead of Google Play Services would make me less vulnerable to that threat. But Graphene devs say things like "MicroG is less secure than Google Play Services".

Similarly, if you want privacy you might secure your device by locking the bootloader with your own keys - not a third-party vendor's keys. Saying that's "insecure" is extremely misleading: it just puts you in charge of security, instead of abdicating to someone else.

I wish there were something like GrapheneOS that let you choose, yourself, who to trust instead of requiring you trust an OS vendor implicitly.

Re:Play Store blocks AuroraStore, hurting GrapheneOS users by exceptione on Tuesday September 01, 2026 @03:04PM (#49526495)

  >  Turning on automatic software updates from Google would make me vulnerable to that threat. Using MicroG instead of Google Play Services would make me less vulnerable to that threat
I would say that any auto-update mechanism is a threat, so in both cases you would disable auto-updates.
Re:Play Store blocks AuroraStore, hurting GrapheneOS users by lucb1e on Tuesday September 01, 2026 @03:47PM (#49527103)
The point is that you might know the people behind microG or trust them for any other reason, but not the people at Google
Re:Play Store blocks AuroraStore, hurting GrapheneOS users by exceptione on Tuesday September 01, 2026 @04:03PM (#49527338)
Fair point.
Re:Play Store blocks AuroraStore, hurting GrapheneOS users by microtonal on Wednesday September 02, 2026 @06:00AM (#49534117)
But Graphene devs say things like "MicroG is less secure than Google Play Services".

It is. microG runs Google DroidGuard blobs in a privileged process (to pass Play Integrity Basic). Reminder for those who forgot about DroidGuard: it's an obfuscated binary blob delivered to you by Google on each request that uses a special VM with constantly changing registers, etc. to avoid analysis.

On GrapheneOS that crap runs in a sandbox.

Re:Play Store blocks AuroraStore, hurting GrapheneOS users by Borealid on Wednesday September 02, 2026 @08:37AM (#49535346)
Actually, MicroG by default doesn't download or run droidguard binaries at all.

You're missing my point here, which is that failing to describe a particular threat scenario leads to meaningless words spoken about ill-defined "security". Security has to be against some particular threat... it's not an absolute concept.