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Re:DNS Abuse and Criminal Infrastructure by amluto on Monday August 31, 2026 @11:56AM (#49511271)
A delay doesn’t even really hurt this use case. The first person to register the domain would still get it, 24 hours later, unless there’s an actual objection.
Re:DNS Abuse and Criminal Infrastructure by edent on Monday August 31, 2026 @12:15PM (#49511485)
I think the "actual objection" is the hardest part.

The UK Government might legitimately object to the registration of `dwpgov-uk-payments.pizza` but should they be allowed to object to `dwp-gov-uk-stole-my-payments.fart`?

One might be obviously dodgy, the other is someone ranting about their experience. Do you think Governments should be able to object to domains complaining about them?

Re:DNS Abuse and Criminal Infrastructure by amluto on Monday August 31, 2026 @02:07PM (#49512791)
I'm not entirely sure. But we have have mechanisms like Google Safe Browsing, and I can imagine that a similar mechanism could be used. Or there could even be a new classification in Safe Browsing and similar databases for newly registered domains that look like they are misleaing, and this could actually be fast enough if there was a 24-hour hold on new domains.
Re:DNS Abuse and Criminal Infrastructure by cucumber3732842 on Monday August 31, 2026 @11:59AM (#49511307)
Who defines "actual objection"? The entrenched interests are really good at tilting such processes in their favor.
Re:DNS Abuse and Criminal Infrastructure by pessimizer on Monday August 31, 2026 @12:38PM (#49511745)
A delay wouldn't change that. You're talking about the difference of the site being up for a half day or not at all, which is admittedly infinity times longer, but not enough to make any sort of difference (as opposed to putting the anti-entrenched interests info up without its own domain name.)