For that matter, the paradox is self-resolving. By labeling the entities it is concerned with as "unnameable things", it has named them. As a collection, entities not otherwise named can be simply referred to as "Bhartrhari's things".
Really, the blurb about "seems impossible to verify this by giving positive instances" contains the tension between constructive math and non-constructive math. Does an unnameable (and undefinable) thing actually exist? If a tree falls in a forest, but no one can hear it, does it make a sound?
I'm not really up on maths so this is possibly a stupid question, but can't any real number be written as an ASCII string, which is basically an integer number, so there is a direct mapping there?
Or is it because the ASCII number wouldn't be in order that makes the difference?
Or is it that you can't write that mapping as a mathematical function perhaps?
But perhaps that's not such a bad thing that I can get answers to my foolish questions!
An unknowable name isn't a very good name, IMHO.
1) let x be a thing
2) I name x "Jeff"
3) all things are nameable (from 1 and 2)
another way to put this is that it's natural to take the paradox as a reductio.