> Alice sends out
Alice can send anything in any cryptographic scheme involving two parties, the only real safety in any of it is "are the odds of an accepted different value low enough to be impractical for an attacker". Does that apply here too?
Re:A quick look at zero-knowledge proofs
by rubyclouds on Sunday August 16, 2026 @10:51PM
(#49326046)
What? Of course it’s a massive security flaw if you let any end user device send anything they want and just go “well they probably won’t send fake amounts”
Imagine such a bank. Or social media (impersonate anyone, just say you’re them on the request why not), or any website.
The “zero knowledge” part of the name checks out.
Re:A quick look at zero-knowledge proofs
by nojokepoke on Sunday August 16, 2026 @09:12PM
(#49325523)
Please explain how Alice’s request can ever be not valid. It’s literally a pre authenticated exchange.
Also nice sock puppet.
It relies on trusting that Alice’s request is valid. If Alice sends another proof, she will have a different balance. Alice decides what to send. The server blindly accepts it.
You actually don’t want that for a lot of security and that’s why nobody uses ZKP for passwords or really anywhere outside theory - dumb theory that doesn’t understand basic web dev. We already have hashing and databases. There is a narrow use case for trusting clients - like receiving updates from intranet or p2p devices - maybe you use ZKP to omit unnecessary pii. But that’s it. It’s not what you think it is.