Re: How to bring down mission-critical GPS networks with $2,500
by trotsky on Friday December 14, 2012 @06:00PM
(#4923836)
It's interesting to note that the drone that the iranians spoofed and forced to land relied on encrypted gps, however they were successful at what is assumed to be a gps spoofing attack. The likely scenario is that systems are designed to fail gracefully - if encrypted streams are unreadable (jamming) unencrypted data may be used.
[ Parent
| on HN ]
Re: How to bring down mission-critical GPS networks with $2,500
by gvb on Friday December 14, 2012 @10:39PM
(#4924525)
"Assumed" is the operating word. A much simpler explanation is that the drone crashed due to a malfunction, the Iranians found the remains, glued and taped it back together (note that they did not show the underside), and then made up the spoofing story for propaganda purposes.
Here is a more skeptical article: http://www.theregister.co.uk/2011/12/21/spy_drone_hijack_gps...
There has been at least one valid spoofing demo: http://www.ae.utexas.edu/news/archive/2012/todd-humphreys-re...
"During the spoofing demonstration at White Sands, the research team took control of a hovering UAV from about a kilometer away. Next year, they plan to perform a similar demonstration on a moving UAV from 10 kilometers away."
That demo was a much simpler scenario than what the Iranians claimed to have done. The demo was a stationary UAV and it was most likely using the civilian (C/A code) signals rather than the (classified) encrypted P-code. They also knew exactly where the UAV was, and could likely see it.