News for hackers. Stuff that matters.
Re:The Quiet Wikideath of BBS History by NateLawson on Wednesday December 12, 2012 @05:06PM (#4912738)
It actually is wrong, in that its summary on Microsoft Research's site shows it advocates for a permutation of a counter (e.g. LFSR) as a solution to glitch attacks against CTR mode.

That's completely ineffective. The paper by Jaffe shows how to perform DPA (passive, not active attack) against various counter modes of AES, despite the permutation in use for the counter.

http://www.iacr.org/workshops/ches/ches2007/presentations/S1...

However, in order for me to remove the first reference and add the second one, I'd have to undertake a war of participation on Wikipedia. The outcome would not be determined by anyone I respect in cryptography, but by people who happen to be dedicated to a particular a message board.

You have your own experience with such people:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk:StankDawg

Wikipedia is a cesspool, and I'm very sad to see "worse but free" winning out yet again.

Re:The Quiet Wikideath of BBS History by tptacek on Wednesday December 12, 2012 @05:23PM (#4912793)
In the spirit of scientific and philosophical inquiry, I simply fixed the WP article we're debating about. It took 4 minutes. I did it under an anonymous IP account. Let's see how much fighting I have to do to defend the fix.

Incidentally, while I strongly advise not reading the "StankDawg Debates", I'll note that they're a case of me, a deletionist, losing an argument to anti-deletionists.