Re:GrapheneOS protections against data extraction from locke...
by muyuu on Sunday July 26, 2026 @02:10PM
(#49060719)
yep, human bias makes 4-digit pins and patterns a lot worse than the theoretical entropy, but still it's a decent starting point
my comment was about the decision of that person who deleted the comment to go for the pattern lock, while/because? 16 chars was supposedly bad for the password (although he/she has a point in that the limitation is annoying and counterproductive)
all of this i reckon was not criticism of GrapheneOS but stock Android, AFAIK grapheneOS's choices are all very sound
Re:GrapheneOS protections against data extraction from locke...
by inigyou on Sunday July 26, 2026 @12:36PM
(#49059783)
Thank you for your service.
Re:GrapheneOS protections against data extraction from locke...
by frumiousirc on Monday July 27, 2026 @07:54AM
(#49068268)
Perhaps bad/naive ideas, but consider these options for unlocking where the requirements changes after one incorrect entry.
- After an incorrect key, require two (or more) consecutive valid key entries.
- After an incorrect key, no longer accept that nominal key until a secondary key is supplied.
GrapheneOS adds the option to set a 2nd factor PIN for fingerprint unlock to make using a strong passphrase convenient without the downsides of biometric-only unlock.
Pattern lock strongly encouraging using only a tiny subset of the possibilities so it's much worse than your analysis shows. It was removed from GrapheneOS years ago because it's far worse than simply generating and using a random 6 digit PIN despite appearing to be similar. It gives a false sense of security and we didn't want to add support for a duress pattern or random pattern generating alongside those planned features. Built-in random PIN and passphrase generation is still in progress but has been started and will be shipped.