Re:NPM packages from Red Hat have been compromised
by vinnymac on Monday June 01, 2026 @10:52AM
(#48357598)
It’s on by default in yarn 4 too now, but pnpm was the first to market that default minimum gate.
Re:NPM packages from Red Hat have been compromised
by user3939382 on Monday June 01, 2026 @11:51AM
(#48358516)
If this were a universal default, would the strategy defeat itself?
Re:NPM packages from Red Hat have been compromised
by Normal_gaussian on Monday June 01, 2026 @12:10PM
(#48358784)
No.
Many places run analyzers on published code; many security users have reason to shorten the period. The default period becomes the period where white hats have a chance to detect it and stop it passing the threshold.
Re:NPM packages from Red Hat have been compromised
by zwily on Monday June 01, 2026 @01:00PM
(#48359494)
Even if everyone used it, the security scanners would still have time to do their static analysis of new packages. Basically, all the clients implementing a delay would create a de facto quarantine status for new packages so they can be examined before everyone starts installing them. (Why npm doesn't just implement that themselves, I do not know.)
Re:NPM packages from Red Hat have been compromised
by user3939382 on Monday June 01, 2026 @10:41PM
(#48365325)
Then shouldn’t the analyzers just be part of NPMs acceptance requirements?
Re:NPM packages from Red Hat have been compromised
by zwily on Tuesday June 02, 2026 @01:27AM
(#48366412)
That’s my point. For whatever reason, npm isn’t doing it. All npm users adding a minimum package age is kind of like doing it as a collective, without npm’s help.
Re:NPM packages from Red Hat have been compromised
by _flux on Tuesday June 02, 2026 @07:35AM
(#48368868)
I think if they did it, then attackers would be able to iterate their attack against their own project, and once it passes the filters they could deploy for real.
I guess it could work better if it was enabled for only actual attack vectors projects.
https://pnpm.io/settings#minimumreleaseage