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Re:Darkbloom – Private inference on idle Macs by btown on Thursday April 16, 2026 @12:48AM (#47788756)
From the paper: https://github.com/Layr-Labs/d-inference/blob/master/papers/...

> Apple’s attestation servers will only generate the FreshnessCode for a genuine device that checks in via APNs. A software-only adversary cannot forge the MDA certificate chain (Assumption 3). Com- bined with SIP enforcement (preventing binary replace- ment) and Secure Boot (preventing bootloader tampering), this provides strong evidence that the signing key resides in genuine Apple hardware.

Re:Darkbloom – Private inference on idle Macs by saagarjha on Thursday April 16, 2026 @03:26AM (#47789794)
I am not entirely sure they understand that System Integrity Protection and Secure Boot can be turned off.
Re:Darkbloom – Private inference on idle Macs by btown on Thursday April 16, 2026 @10:36AM (#47793622)
My understanding from the paper is that doing so should cause certain things in Apple's hardware security enclaves to break a signing chain, and a server-side MDM system integrated with Apple servers can detect this. But I'm not familiar with the underlying technology, so not sure if underlying assumptions are incorrect.
Re:Darkbloom – Private inference on idle Macs by saagarjha on Friday April 17, 2026 @08:54AM (#47805413)
AFAIK that just ensures the SEP is present but perhaps they are signing the boot state now