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Re:Microsoft Abruptly Terminates VeraCrypt Account, Halting ... by AnthonyMouse on Thursday April 09, 2026 @04:10PM (#47709125)
You're assuming the attacker never had write access to the encrypted partition. If the system was compromised while it was running, they do. If the key is in a TPM and they can extract it using a TPM vulnerability or specialized equipment, they do. And keeping the key in the TPM instead of a remote system or external media also gives them a third one: Now the system can boot up and unlock the partition by itself by running the original signed boot chain, giving the attacker the opportunity to compromise the now-running OS using DMA attacks etc. Or they can stick it in a drawer without network access to receive updates until someone publishes a relevant vulnerability in the version of the OS that was on it when it was stolen.

Whereas if the FDE key was never stored on the device to begin with, they need the system to be running and unlocked before the victim realizes they have access, which is the one where you're screwed in either case.

Notice that if they can replace the device without you noticing then they can leave you one that displays the same unlock screen as the original but sends any credentials you enter to the attacker. Once they've had physical access to the device you can't trust it. The main advantage of FDE is that they can't read what was on a powered off device they steal, and then the last thing you want is for the FDE key to be somewhere on the device that they could potentially extract instead of on a remote system or removable media that they don't have access to.

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