By proving that when the user clicked "Yes, I want this loan, $X deposited on amount Y" that is actually what was on the screen then the user clicked approve. In other words, that the agreement is actually what the REMOTE party believes it is, even if the owner installed "Free coins in the bunny casino v7.0.apk" from a website.
(meaning that is not currently very provable, and exploited by scammers quite a bit. Courts have a nasty irritating habit of holding the more powerful party (ie. the bank/government) responsible for the consequences of scammers' actions. Well, at least from the viewpoint of banks/governments that is a nasty habit)
From my limited understanding, I can immediately think of a dozen ways to implement such an attack, and none would be helped by Google attesting that the device is indeed a legitimate Android(tm) device.
It is very hard to understand how this would make any difference juridically. The technical difficulties of avoiding phishing aside, contracts can be contested for a multitude of reasons, including contracts being signed involuntarily.
Because if it is the end user, the strong version of the argument would be as follows: The end user signs a document, baked in is an attestation that Google guarantees that this device is an approved Android device with a clean boot chain and a Chrome web browser. Then the end user contests the signature in court, either because they didn't understand what they signed, or they did not sign it at all, or did it under threat. How could the attestation help here?
I do not have experience with all EU countries, of course, but more than one, and nowhere is this an issue today. Countries use a wide variety of electronic identification, from soft certificates and mobile phones to smart cards. But as far as I know, all countries accept signatures made even with normal Windows PCs. You can contest a signed document in court for a multitude of reasons, but that's not specific to electronic signatures.