Re:Post Mortem: axios NPM supply chain compromise
by dcrazy on Thursday April 02, 2026 @11:24PM
(#47622869)
The attacker installed a RAT on the contributor’s machine, so if they had configured TOTP or saved the recovery codes anywhere on that machine, the attacker could defeat 2FA.
Re:Post Mortem: axios NPM supply chain compromise
by yjftsjthsd-h on Friday April 03, 2026 @01:07AM
(#47623362)
Oh, yes, I missed that the TOTP machine was compromised:\ Would that then imply that it would have been okay if codes came from a separate device, eg. a TOTP app on a Palm OS device with zero network connectivity? (Or maybe these days the easiest airgapped option is an old android phone that stays in airplane mode...)
Re:Post Mortem: axios NPM supply chain compromise
by dcrazy on Friday April 03, 2026 @01:30AM
(#47623473)
The easiest approach is a provider-issued hardware dongle like a SecurID or Yubikey. Lack of end-user programmability is a feature, not a bug.
Re:Post Mortem: axios NPM supply chain compromise
by yjftsjthsd-h on Friday April 03, 2026 @01:33AM
(#47623490)
> Lack of end-user programmability is a feature, not a bug.
I would argue that the problem is network accessibility, not programmability.
Re:Post Mortem: axios NPM supply chain compromise
by dcrazy on Friday April 03, 2026 @01:44AM
(#47623537)
When designing a system for secure attestation, end-user programmability is not a feature.
It would not be an advantage for your front door lock to be infinitely reprogrammable. It’s just a liability.
Re:Post Mortem: axios NPM supply chain compromise
by yjftsjthsd-h on Friday April 03, 2026 @02:07AM
(#47623660)
I mean, I guess attestation might have some value, but it feels like moving the goalposts. Under the threat model of a remote attacker who can compromise a normal networked computer, I can't think of an attack that would succeed with a programmable TOTP code generator that would fail if that code generator was not reprogrammable. Can you?
> It would not be an advantage for your front door lock to be infinitely reprogrammable. It’s just a liability.
Er, most door locks are infinitely reprogrammable, because being able to rekey them without having to replace the whole unit is a huge advantage and the liability/disadvantage is minimal (falling under "It rather involved being on the other side of this airtight hatchway" in an unusually almost-literal sense where you have to be inside the house in order to rekey the lock, at which point you could also do anything else).
Re:Post Mortem: axios NPM supply chain compromise
by dcrazy on Friday April 03, 2026 @02:38AM
(#47623843)
Sorry, attestation is the goalpost. The community wants certainty that the package was published by a human with authority, and not just by someone who had access to an authority’s private keys. That is what distinguishes attestation from authentication or authorization.
Re:Post Mortem: axios NPM supply chain compromise
by nurettin on Friday April 03, 2026 @01:29AM
(#47623466)
Yes, unfortunately authenticator apps just generate TOTP codes based on a binary key sitting in plain sight without any encryption. Not that it would help if the encrypting/decrypting machine is pwned.
Edit: wait, did the attacker intercept the totp code as it was entered? Trying to make sense of the thread