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Re:Telnyx v4.87.1 and v4.87.2 are compromised by TeamPCP by LtWorf on Saturday March 28, 2026 @05:09AM (#47552904)
If they have compromised the token wouldn't that mean the developer is compromised and such access can be used to just put "curl whatever" into the build and publish that payload on pypi?
Re:Telnyx v4.87.1 and v4.87.2 are compromised by TeamPCP by woodruffw on Saturday March 28, 2026 @09:03AM (#47554223)
I don’t understand the question, sorry.
Re:Telnyx v4.87.1 and v4.87.2 are compromised by TeamPCP by LtWorf on Saturday March 28, 2026 @11:06AM (#47555248)
I'll try to reformulate in a simpler way.

On debian, all builds happen without internet access. So whatever ends up on the .deb file is either contained on the dependencies or in the orig tarball.

Is anything similar done for builds that create artifacts for pypi, so that a certain correspondence between binary file and sources exists? Or is there unrestricted internet access so that what actually ends up on pypi can come from anywhere and vetting the sources is of little help?

Re:Telnyx v4.87.1 and v4.87.2 are compromised by TeamPCP by woodruffw on Saturday March 28, 2026 @12:18PM (#47555959)
That’s a nice property of centralized package management systems; I don’t think anything exactly like that exists for PyPI. The closest thing would be a cryptographic attestation.

(If I wanted to taxonomize these things, I say that the Debian model is effectively a pinky promise that the source artifacts correspond to the built product, except that it’s a better pinky promise because it’s one-to-many instead of many-to-many like language package managers generally are. You can then formalize that pinky promise with keys and signatures, but at the end of the day you’re still essentially binding a promise.)

Re:Telnyx v4.87.1 and v4.87.2 are compromised by TeamPCP by functional_dev on Saturday March 28, 2026 @01:32PM (#47556666)
wasnt PEP 740 an attempt to solve this?
Re:Telnyx v4.87.1 and v4.87.2 are compromised by TeamPCP by woodruffw on Saturday March 28, 2026 @06:38PM (#47558702)
Depends on what you mean by “this.” If you mean build provenance, yes, if you mean transmuting PyPI into the kind of trust topology that Debian (for example) has, no.

(I think PEP 740 largely succeeds at providing build provenance; having downstream tooling actually do useful things with that provenance is harder for mostly engineering coordination reasons.)