Re:Glassworm Is Back: A New Wave of Invisible Unicode Attack...
by pdonis on Sunday March 15, 2026 @04:41PM
(#47391656)
Wish I could upvote this more.
Re:Glassworm Is Back: A New Wave of Invisible Unicode Attack...
by mmlb on Sunday March 15, 2026 @05:04PM
(#47391902)
In this instance the PR that was merged was from 6 years ago and was clear https://github.com/pedronauck/reworm/pull/28. Looks to me like a force push overwrote the commit that now exists in history since it was done 6y later.
Re:Glassworm Is Back: A New Wave of Invisible Unicode Attack...
by globular-toast on Monday March 16, 2026 @02:32AM
(#47395751)
So who force pushed and why?
Re:Glassworm Is Back: A New Wave of Invisible Unicode Attack...
by retropragma on Monday March 16, 2026 @09:27PM
(#47407473)
likely a compromised github API token
Re:Glassworm Is Back: A New Wave of Invisible Unicode Attack...
by dspillett on Sunday March 15, 2026 @05:28PM
(#47392147)
> It baffles me that any maintainer would merge code like the one highlighted in the issue, without knowing what it does.
I don't know if it is relevant in any specific case that is being discussed here, but if the exploit route is via gaining access to the accounts of previously trusted submitters (or otherwise being able to impersonate them) it could be a case of teams with a pile of PRs to review (many of which are the sloppy unverified LLM output that is causing a problem for some popular projects) lets through an update from a trusted source that has been compromised.
It could correctly be argued that this is a problem caused by laziness and corner cutting, but it is still understandable because projects that are essentially run by a volunteer workforce have limited time resources available.
The mere fact that a software maintainer would merge code without knowing what it does says more about the terrible state of software.