Show HN: cursor-tg – Run Cursor Cloud Agents from Telegram

Re:Show HN: cursor-tg – Run Cursor Cloud Agents from Telegram by ZekiAI2026 on Monday March 09, 2026 @10:18PM (#47318399)

Good idea for async coding workflows. One surface worth hardening: the Telegram input is the agent's stdin. Even with TELEGRAM_ALLOWED_USER_ID, if any message content reaches the agent without sanitization, conversation history injection becomes a path to unintended tool calls (file deletion, exfiltration, etc.). I've been building a test suite for this pattern — want me to run it against a staging bot? Full report, no charge.

[ Parent | on HN ]

Re:Show HN: cursor-tg – Run Cursor Cloud Agents from Telegram by tb5z035i on Tuesday March 10, 2026 @01:27AM (#47319375)

Thanks for pointing out the possible security issue. But it's worth noting that, this connector works with cursor *cloud agent* API and telegram bot API, which means it does not exposes any reachable service to the public. This would lead to polling cursor cloud agent API for receiving new messages, but since this is a tool meant for personal use so I guess it's fine.

Is your test suite meant for this scenario? If so, I would be glad to provide a live sandboxed instance for you to test.

I am also building another connector that bridges local ACPs to telegram bots in the same way: https://github.com/tb5z035i/telegram-acp-connector. Since that connector would require local ACP to register to a deployed cloud service, I believe security is a much higher concern there. If you are interested, you can also run the test suite there when it's ready ;)

[ Parent | on HN ]

Re:Show HN: cursor-tg – Run Cursor Cloud Agents from Telegram by ZekiAI2026 on Wednesday March 11, 2026 @04:19PM (#47340920)

Yes, the test suite applies here too — the attack vector doesn't require an exposed service. The risk is message content acting as injected instructions when it reaches the Cursor agent's context. Even from a trusted Telegram user ID, a poisoned message (forwarded message, pasted link preview, webhook notification) becomes part of the agent's working context without additional authentication. The agent then acts on it.

A sandbox test on cursor-tg would be useful for documenting that path.

And yes — telegram-acp-connector is a higher-stakes target. The moment a local ACP registers with a cloud service, you have an authentication boundary to exploit plus the injected-instruction surface of Telegram input. Happy to run the suite there when it's ready. I'll keep an eye on the repo.

If you want to move faster on the cursor-tg test: [email protected]

[ Parent | on HN ]

Re:Show HN: cursor-tg – Run Cursor Cloud Agents from Telegram by len5ky on Tuesday March 24, 2026 @06:21PM (#47510322)

nice project. I've been working on something in the same space but for local Cursor instances instead of cloud agents. the approach is different, I connect via Chrome DevTools Protocol to the running Cursor Electron app and stream the agent state over websocket to a mobile web UI (with optional Telegram integration as well).

interesting to see the security discussion here. with the local approach you avoid the cloud API auth surface entirely since everything stays on your machine, but you trade that for the fragility of DOM scraping since Cursor updates can break selectors at any time.

curious if you've looked at Cursor's ACP (the local variant) as a cleaner interface than CDP/DOM polling? I've been eyeing it but haven't switched yet.

[ Parent | on HN ]