Re:Reverse-engineering the UniFi inform protocol
by ThePowerOfFuet on Monday March 09, 2026 @01:41PM
(#47312450)
>If you subscribe to the mindset of "new domains are likely to be bad" you just deal with a steady stream of allowlist requests from your users until the end of time.
Newly-registered domains are not generally an issue with enterprise users. However, they are overrepresented in malicious traffic due to domain-generation algorithms (DGAs).
Re:Reverse-engineering the UniFi inform protocol
by Terretta on Monday March 09, 2026 @06:26PM
(#47316543)
> Newly-registered domains are not generally an issue with enterprise users.
I take it this means enterprise users are not generally needing to do anything legit-for-work on a newly registered domain.
Enterprise clicks on newly registered domains tend to be (a) being phished or smished or cryptomined or whatever, or (b) someone reading X or Bsky or HN or ProductHunt's vibe code of the date -- things the enterprise would also like to have blocked.
Consider the CloudFlare/Proofpoint/NextDNS/etc. domain block on new domains much like updating one's HN home page to https://news.ycombinator.com/classic …
Re:Reverse-engineering the UniFi inform protocol
by slacka on Monday March 09, 2026 @02:03PM
(#47312830)
Sounds like a massive waste of your time for NextDNS admins and a poor UX for end users. If your security relies on trusting old domains, then you need to rethink your security. Also, I bet it's just as easy for you to accidentally whitelist a bad actors as to blacklist a good one. What am I missing here?
We get this a lot at my job, where many customers' admins block s3 buckets by default. We give our customers a list of hostnames to allowlist and if they can't figure it out, that's on them.