certificate companies sell trust, not certificates.
There's absolutely no excuse for hardware vendors not to provide end users the choice.
> trust is protected by trusted companies...
The less control of and visibility into their product you have the less trustworthy they are.
asus gives out keys to sign bios firmware, now aliexpress can not only counterfeit, but provide tampered hardware.
you can enroll your own secure boot keys so that's not really relevant.
I'll grant that if the user is given control then compromise within the supply chain does become possible. However the same hypothetical malicious aliexpress vendor could also enroll a custom secure boot key, install "definitely totally legit windows", and unless the user inspects he might well never realize the deception. Or the supply chain could embed a keylogger. Or ...
As a power user, do I want boot guard on my personal PC? Honestly, no. And we’re in luck because a huge amount of consumer motherboards have a Boot Guard profile so insecure it’s basically disabled. But do I want our laptops at work to have it, or the server I have at a colocation facility to have it? Yes I do. Because I don’t want my server to have a bootkit installed by someone with an SPI flasher. I don’t want my HR rep getting hidden, persistent malware because they ran an exe disguised as a pdf. It’s valuable in some contexts.