Re:Show HN: yolo-cage – AI coding agents that can't exfiltra...
by bpodgursky on Wednesday January 21, 2026 @03:48PM
(#46711336)
I would worry less about external attack sophistication and more about your LLM getting annoyed by the restrictions and encrypting the password to bypass the sandbox to achieve a goal (like running on an EC2 instance). Because they are very capable of doing this.
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Re:Show HN: yolo-cage – AI coding agents that can't exfiltra...
by catlifeonmars on Thursday January 22, 2026 @12:52AM
(#46715763)
It sounds like you speak from experience
Re:Show HN: yolo-cage – AI coding agents that can't exfiltra...
by ErikBjare on Thursday January 22, 2026 @07:31AM
(#46718395)
An informative rejection message with the reason for the restriction usually addresses this well with recent models.
Re:Show HN: yolo-cage – AI coding agents that can't exfiltra...
by bpodgursky on Thursday January 22, 2026 @10:28AM
(#46720519)
I don't actually think recent models are likely to violate intent like this, just that if they do want to, I don't think a plaintext check is a strong deterrent.