The only real way to make devices securely re-usable with custom firmware requires some explicit steps and action to signal that the user wants to run 3rd-party firmware: A specific button press sequence is enough. You need to require the user to do something explicit to acknowledge that 3rd-party software is being installed, though.
Forcing vendors to release their security mechanisms to the public and allow anyone to sign firmware as the company is not what you want, though.
When the vendor discontinues support for the device, they make available to their customers an optional update to the second stage bootloader that allows any application image to run, not just images signed by the vendor. This updated second stage loader is signed with the keypair fused into the MCU, and so it will run as per normal. They make it so this update can only be installed with some sort of local interaction with the device, not automatically over the air.
Devices in the field running ordinary OEM firmware continue to be protected from malicious OTA updates. Customers who wish to unlock their devices also have the means to do so.
This is very technically straightforward to implement, but it needs to be considered when the device is designed. Regulations would be required to make sure that happens.
Instead of [get released SB keys] -> [boot arbitrary payloads]
It becomes [get unlocked second stage bootloader] -> [boot arbitrary payloads]
Although, I guess that the details matter in terms of the process used to supply OTAs and second stage bootloaders. If changing to the unlocked bootloader requires physical access (or some such thing), then I could see that working.
Is there anything else I'm missing?
The question is one of how you can hand control to the user without endangering your legitimate commercial interests as well as the security of the rest of the fleet, exactly how you tackle that will depend on the product.
How would you envision the opt-in process for the unlocked second stage bootloader?
Have you seen the state of embedded device security? It is already an unmitigated disaster.
Since you bring up botnets, there are far more exploited security vulnerabilities because a vendor EOLed support (or went bankrupt) and their firmware contained bugs that cannot be fixed because a signed firmware is required, or the source code was not provided than because their signing keys were leaked and someone is distributing malicious updates.
> Forcing vendors to release their security mechanisms to the public and allow anyone to sign firmware as the company is not what you want, though.
Yes, it is what I want. I am perfectly aware of the potential downsides and what I am proposing is worth it. The product is already EOL. In our current era of enshittification, vendor pinky promises to implement a user-bypass in their signed boot chain is not good enough. Look at the Other OS controversy on the PS3 if you want an example of this in practice, or Samsung removing bootloader unlocking in their One UI 8.0 update.
> The only real way to make devices securely re-usable with custom firmware requires some explicit steps and action to signal that the user wants to run 3rd-party firmware: A specific button press sequence is enough. You need to require the user to do something explicit to acknowledge that 3rd-party software is being installed, though.
The vendor has implemented an internal pad on the laser-welded, weather sealed, IP-rated smart watch that must be shorted to disable secure boot. Opening the device to access this will essentially destroy it, but we preserved the vendor's secure boot signing keys so missioned accomplished!
I agree that devices shouldn’t be locked by the manufacturer AND I think that silently unlocking all devices all at once could do harm.
If security was an unmitigated disaster on every device then it would be trivial to root them all and install your own software, wouldn’t it?
I run a bunch of stuff using Home Assistant via the Zigbee integration - the Zigbee host on the local server gets to decide where to install updates from - which was the security mechanism for most most software for most of history.
Get your stuff from a reputable source. Signage keys are nice, but they don't work as the sole security measure in an unsound supply chain.
IIRC, a certain Marvell SoC datasheet says multiple key slots are supported, but the boot ROM only supports reading the first entry (so really, only one key is supported).
You couldn't boot straight from boot ROM -> UEFI for instance.
Their argument is that an unlocked firmware would allow us to override regulatory restrictions like the RF output power or the IMEI number. That argument has some merit. However, my opinion is that such restrictions should be implemented as hardware interlocks that are unchangeable through software. Thus, we would be free to change the software as we like. Sadly, both the manufacturers and the regulatory agencies tend to completely ignore that solution, so that they can retain their excess control.
This is the goal of law enforcement and justice in general and in this argument, a hardware manufacturer is substituting this role, when we say that, we can see the overreach. Manufacturers aren't public entities able to make such decisions.
Locking people out of their phone does not raise the skill or effort ceiling much, as there still presumably would be software restrictions in place.
But I do agree that we should be able to unlock and relock the bootloader. That's one of the reasons GrapheneOS supports the Google Pixel, for instance. The security model relies on the locked bootloader.
Yeah sure there's a few cases where it make sense but they are few and far between.
It is desirable for anyone who doesn't want malware.
The OS is borked even before you install even a single of these highly sandboxed third party apps.
While in theory that model sounds great, in practice the security is worse than your average Linux distribution and the only people which managed to make it work is the GrapheneOS non-profit representing less that 0.1% of the devices.
(And ironically the only secure Android rom doesn't fully pass Play Integrity)
I don't know if there is much value in arguments like "in theory that's great, but in practice I don't trust anyone other than X so anything that is not X is worse".
So we're back to square one then, it's pointless because you can't trust mobile OS like you can with desktop OS.
Before talking about secure boot, Android needs a way to attest what's in the OS we're saying we are booting...
I'm not even sure Google themselves are fully aware of what's inside specific models.
> I don't know if there is much value in arguments like "in theory that's great, but in practice I don't trust anyone other than X so anything that is not X is worse".
I would rephrase it as why attesting that we have an unknown and outdated OS is valuable to the phone owner?
> I would rephrase it as why attesting that we have an unknown and outdated OS is valuable to the phone owner?
I am not sure if you're genuinely not understanding what the secure boot does, or if you're just venting about the situation with mobile phones.
The secure boot is there to attest that the OS running on your phone is coming from the manufacturer and has not been tampered with by a malware. If you don't trust the manufacturer or if the manufacturer doesn't update the OS frequently enough, then I guess you should look for another manufacturer. GrapheneOS is pretty much up-to-date.
> you don't trust the manufacturer or if the manufacturer doesn't update the OS frequently enough, then I guess you should look for another manufacturer.
The only manufacturers in the world publishing device trees nowadays must be Fairphone and OnePlus because even Google stopped releasing them with the last Pixel. So here you go, you I gave you the entire list of manufacturers (two) for which to my knowledge secure boot provides some value to the phone owner (some others might exist), I'm willing to include GrapheneOS as a third case where it makes sense even if it's not the stock OS.
And the only rom in the world being updated on time is also GrapheneOS (yes, even Pixels still have delays)
You say correct things, but you make wrong conclusions. Secure boot does provide value to the phone owner, period. Not against the manufacturer, but there is pretty much nothing consumers can do against the manufacturer except trusting it.
This concept works fine for the author's example of a kitchen scale, but fails when the device in question is something like a router that has secure boot with one key burned into e-fuses.
In that case we need both open software and a requirement that the manufacturer escrow signing keys with someone so that after EOL any software can be run.