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Re:Cowork: Claude Code for the rest of your work by heliumtera on Monday January 12, 2026 @04:55PM (#46594834)
What would you consider a tight sandboxed without exfiltration vectors? Agents are used to run arbitrary compute. Even a simple write to disk can be part of an exfiltration method. Instructions, bash scripts, programs written by agents can be evaluated outside the sandbox and cause harm. Is this a concern? Or, alternatively, your concern is what type of information can leak outside of that particular tight sandbox? In this case I think you would have to disallow any internet communication besides the LLM provider itself, including the underlying host of the sandbox.

You brought this up a couple of times now, would appreciate clarification.

Re:Cowork: Claude Code for the rest of your work by TeMPOraL on Monday January 12, 2026 @08:38PM (#46596430)
> In this case I think you would have to disallow any internet communication besides the LLM provider itself, including the underlying host of the sandbox.

And the user too, because a human can also be prompt-injected! Prompt injection is fundamentally just LLM flavor of social engineering.