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Re:Tailscale state file encryption no longer enabled by default by snailmailman on Wednesday January 07, 2026 @04:10PM (#46532852)
Those issues are a surprising read. I would expect issues with TPM on old or niche devices, but not Dell XPS laptops, or a variety of VMs. But I guess I'm not entirely sure how my vms handle TPM state, or if they even can.

I'm running nearly all of my personal tailscale instances in containers and VMs. Looking now at the dashboard, it appears this feature really only encrypted things on my primary linux and windows pc, my iphone, and my main linux server's host. None of the VMs+containers i use were able to take advantage of this, nor was my laptop. Although my laptop might be too old.

Re:Tailscale state file encryption no longer enabled by default by Macha on Wednesday January 07, 2026 @04:45PM (#46533424)
I had a Ryzen 3900x on a gigabyte motherboard and the fTPM was just totally unreliable for a pretty mainstream combination. Not fully sure which was to blame there.

At least it was fixed in the 5900x (and _different_ gigabyte motherboard, but from the same lineup) that replaced it.

Re:Tailscale state file encryption no longer enabled by default by Marsymars on Wednesday January 07, 2026 @06:24PM (#46534714)
This jumped out to me because I had a TPM problem on an FM2 Gigabyte mobo in ~2015. (Back when a TPM on desktop mobos required a plug-in module.)

It took me months of hassling Gigabyte to get them to issue me a beta BIOS that fixed the bug, and the fix never did make it to a non-beta BIOS.

Re:Tailscale state file encryption no longer enabled by default by evanjrowley on Wednesday January 07, 2026 @04:45PM (#46533428)
My eyes have opened up to the pitfalls of TPM recently while upgrading CPUs and BIOS/UEFI versions on various hardware in my home.

VMs typically do not use TPMs, so it is not surprising that the feature was not being used there. One common exception is VMware, which can provide the host's TPM to the VM for a better Windows 11 experience. One caveat is this doesn't work on most Ryzen systems because they implement a CPU-based fTPM that VMware does not accept.

Re:Tailscale state file encryption no longer enabled by default by bdavbdav on Wednesday January 07, 2026 @05:38PM (#46534178)
AIUI most hypervisors offer vTPM - it’s disabled by default often, but most solutions have it (including Proxmox / KVM (using swtpm)
Re:Tailscale state file encryption no longer enabled by default by asciii on Wednesday January 07, 2026 @09:44PM (#46536546)
I did not realize that the fTPM on CPU can also cause speed lags and stuttering because of the overhead of security stuff
Re:Tailscale state file encryption no longer enabled by default by zozbot234 on Wednesday January 07, 2026 @04:54PM (#46533583)
It is in fact surprising that TPMs can be wiped so easily. It makes them almost useless compared to dedicated solutions like physical FIDO keys or smartcards, and does not bode well for hardware-backed Passkeys that would also be inherently reliant on TPM storage.
Re:Tailscale state file encryption no longer enabled by default by Fnoord on Wednesday January 07, 2026 @07:40PM (#46535450)
Not all TPM. I've yet to manage it on my MBP M1 Pro or my Pixel. Of course, M1-M3 have broken secure enclave which cannot be fixed by the user.

On AMD with fTPM I get a fat warning if I want to reset the fTPM keys. I think earlier implementations failed here.

> and does not bode well for hardware-backed Passkeys that would also be inherently reliant on TPM storage.

So you revoke the key and auth in another way (or you use a backup). One passkey is never meant to be the one sole way of auth.

I actually like the concept. Consider a situation where you would log into your webmail while in a café or bus. If the password is tied to your hardware, nobody can watch over your shoulder to use it on theirs.

I don't use them much (I've been forced to) because I already use a self-hosted password manager where I never see the password myself. But for the average person, passkeys are better.

Now, if you compare with FIDO2, those are supposed to be with you all the time (something you have). So they can be used on multiple platforms, while a TPM is tied to hardware.

Re:Tailscale state file encryption no longer enabled by default by arthurcolle on Wednesday January 07, 2026 @07:50PM (#46535537)
> Of course, M1-M3 have broken secure enclave which cannot be fixed by the user.

haven't heard about this, link?

Re:Tailscale state file encryption no longer enabled by default by Fnoord on Wednesday January 07, 2026 @07:56PM (#46535582)
Called GoFetch, from (approx) Mar 21 2024 [1]. In 2022 there was a side channel attack called Augury on M1 / A14. The article refers to it.

[1] https://arstechnica.com/security/2024/03/hackers-can-extract...

Re:Tailscale state file encryption no longer enabled by default by hollerith on Thursday January 08, 2026 @03:35PM (#46546090)
Not good, but that really doesn't sound like a vuln in the Secure Enclave but rather in the main CPU.
Re:Tailscale state file encryption no longer enabled by default by heavyset_go on Wednesday January 07, 2026 @11:54PM (#46537334)
You can DoS many physical FIDO tokens by using the wrong PIN on purpose several times.

They're programmed to lock or reset as a security measure. If they're locked, they need a special process, software and credentials to unlock them, which you might not have immediate, or any, access to.

If they reset, it's no different than wiping a TPM.

Re:Tailscale state file encryption no longer enabled by default by slyn on Wednesday January 07, 2026 @05:16PM (#46533890)
Just had a system board replaced on a device in my org, Dell laptop.

As part of setting up a device in our org we enroll our device in Intune (Microsoft's cloud-based device management tool aka UEM / RMM / MDM / etc). To enroll your device you take a "hardware hash" which's basically TPM attestation and some additional spices and upload it to their admin portal.

After the system board replacement we got errors that the device is in another orgs tenant. This is not unusual (you open a ticket with MS and they typically fix it for you), and really isn't to blame on Dell per se. Why ewaste equipment you can refurbish?

Just adding 5c to the anecdata out there re: TPM as an imperfect solution.

Re:Tailscale state file encryption no longer enabled by default by Fnoord on Wednesday January 07, 2026 @07:30PM (#46535359)
When I replaced a motherboard (rest of the hw was OK) Microsoft was of the opinion I had a 'new computer' and would need to buy a new Windows 10 license (of IIRC 150 EUR → scoundrels). I went to G2A and bought one for 20 EUR. Then it hit me. This occurred before when my previous motherboard/CPU was broken, and back then I actually called Microsoft where they insisted on selling me a new license. I did exactly the same back then.
Re:Tailscale state file encryption no longer enabled by default by techcode on Thursday January 08, 2026 @12:55AM (#46537698)
I've had quite the opposite experience with Microsoft.

One time their support just give me a licence for a newer version of Windows - I've replaced the HDD/SSD, cloned/copied it and it was not activated. I contacted their chat support from that laptop and when they asked me for licence on the sticker I mentioned I'll have to come back in 5 minutes since I'll have to turn off laptop, and take out battery to see the MS sticker/hologram.

Support said "No worries, here's a new activation key".

Can't recall if it was from XP to Win 7, or Win 7 to 10.

--

And after buying 2 or 3 licences from another website just like G2A (Win 10 was ~€10 on Instant-Gaming) - a bunch of new computers (even brand new assembled desktops) were automatically activated.

Re:Tailscale state file encryption no longer enabled by default by literalAardvark on Thursday January 08, 2026 @08:18AM (#46540625)
I've handled technical+legal concerns for licensing for a very small org in a different lifetime, and yes, that's exactly how Microsoft used to think of licenses. I don't know how it works these days, it's someone else's problem.

We had to archive invoices+servicing documentation for warrantied mobos from the supplier to keep a legal licensing chain.

Re:Tailscale state file encryption no longer enabled by default by Fnoord on Thursday January 08, 2026 @10:07AM (#46541883)
I remember the path my license had: it was a free upgrade to Windows 10, from Windows 7 (right before they removed said free upgrade; I tend to be slow with adapter Windows versions). The original Windows 7 license was a pirated one, but that didn't matter (we know why: before GDPR, Microsoft could spy on Windows 10 users, and the pirated Windows 7 was already a lost sale).

Apparently the free upgrade was OEM, bound to the hardware. I did not know. Either way, I'm from Europe (EU), and here a software license cannot be exhausted via second hand market, so it stands to reason I can buy one second hand. That this isn't what Microsoft support is told to discuss, suuure (even when I explicitly asked for it, they insisted I had to buy it via them).

Re:Tailscale state file encryption no longer enabled by default by 9x39 on Wednesday January 07, 2026 @05:39PM (#46534191)
Stuff breaks all the time, you just need a bigger sample size.

Overseeing IT admins for corp fleets is part of my gig, and from my experience, we get malfunctioning TPMs on anything consumer - Lenovo, Dell, HP, whatever. I think the incidence is some fraction of a percent, but get a few thousand devices and the chance of eventually experiencing it is high, very high. I can't imagine a vTPM being perfect either, since there isn't a hypervisor out there someone hasn't screwed up a VM on.

Re:Tailscale state file encryption no longer enabled by default by yndoendo on Wednesday January 07, 2026 @08:30PM (#46535902)
The issue could be a bug in the host OS not in the VM. I had a Windows update that broke VMs when the guest OS was Windows running in real-time mode. This was the only issue and if I didn't run real-time VMs I would have never known. The only resolution was to reinstall Windows.
Re:Tailscale state file encryption no longer enabled by default by c0nsumer on Wednesday January 07, 2026 @10:23PM (#46536800)
Many, many more devices here... And good/typical enterprise level hardware... And failing TPMs are just something that happen. It's pretty expected these days. And on Windows when it causes a loss of certificates, it's actually a good bit more of a pain than just a dying disk or display or something, because it's not immediately obvious what's wrong, it just doesn't talk to the network properly anymore, or so.

I'm not surprised by Tailscale's change here. It's a good move.

Re:Tailscale state file encryption no longer enabled by default by behringer on Wednesday January 07, 2026 @08:05PM (#46535664)
I'm not sure what makes any of this "surprising". Each ticket reads like "we replaced the computer that tailscale was on, it doesn't work anymore" pikachu face.

Yeah, that was a feature and the exact reason why we use TPMs. I guess it should have been better advertised.

Re:Tailscale state file encryption no longer enabled by default by justincormack on Thursday January 08, 2026 @05:07AM (#46539307)
VMs don't have TPMs as they are hw devices, although you can run a software TPM (potentially backed by the host TPM) and pass it to them, which you might want to do for this use case.
Re:Tailscale state file encryption no longer enabled by default by wolvoleo on Thursday January 08, 2026 @10:48AM (#46542386)
That would be nice, in that case you can extract also keys that apps store in there. Interesting, I'll try that out.
Re:Tailscale state file encryption no longer enabled by default by braiamp on Thursday January 08, 2026 @09:54AM (#46541724)
As some kernel developers have said: motherboard manufacturers are really bad making sure stuffs works.