Re:PassSeeds – hijacking Passkeys to unlock new cryptographi...
by sandeepkd on Tuesday January 06, 2026 @10:50PM
(#46522324)
I think if you are doing it in the browser then you bind the flow to the request origin making it phishing resistant compared to a static, origin agnostic storage
Re:PassSeeds – hijacking Passkeys to unlock new cryptographi...
by csuwldcat on Tuesday January 06, 2026 @08:30PM
(#46521379)
How it's better: automatically synced across all a user's devices, not subject to manual interactions with input fields (you can't programmatically request/regen passwords the same way you can with this).
I did use AI for the ECDSA public key recovery diagram, because I wasn't about to spend hours hand rolling that in Lunacy. It's correct in broad strokes, and anyone who wants to understand it more deeply can just look at the code, imo.
Re:PassSeeds – hijacking Passkeys to unlock new cryptographi...
by sandeepkd on Tuesday January 06, 2026 @10:54PM
(#46522346)
IMO automatic sync is a mess with the passkeys, it just muddies the whole guarantees around security based on possession, its not available unless you are signed in on the platform (eg. apple account) making the behavior inconsistent
Also, the "ECDSA Public Key Recovery" picture makes me suspect this is AI slop.