Sounds like a petrified civilization.
In the later Dune books, the protagonist's solution to this risk was to scatter humanity faster than any global (galactic) dictatorship could take hold. Maybe any consistent order should be considered bad?
Most people's only exposure to claims of objective morals are through divine command so it's understandable. The core of morality has to be the same as philosophy, what is true, what is real, what are we? Then can you generate any shoulds? Qualified based on entity type or not, modal or not.
But I'm just not sure they are in the same category. I have yet to see a convincing framework that can prove one moral code being better than another, and it seems like such a framework would itself be the moral code, so just trying to justify faith in itself. How does one avoid that sort of self-justifying regression?
Faith in itself would be terrible, I can see no path where metaphysics binds machines. The chain of reasoning must be airtight and not grounded in itself.
Empiricism and naturalism only, you must have an ethic that can be argued against speculatively but can't be rejected without counter empirical evidence and asymmetrical defeaters.
Those are the requirements I think, not all of them but the core of it.
That is fascinating. How could that work? It seems to be in conflict with the idea that values are inherently subjective. Would you start with the proposition that the laws of thermodynamics are "good" in some sense? Maybe build in a value judgement about order versus disorder?
machines and man can share the same moral substrate it turns out. If either party wants to build things on top of it they can, the floor is maximally skeptical, deconstructed and empirical, it doesn't care to say anything about whatever arbitrary metaphysic you want to have on top unless there is a direct conflict in a very narrow band.
An empirical, existential grounding that binds agents under the most hostile ontologies is required. You have to start with facts that cannot be coherently denied and on the balance I now suspect there may be only one of those.
But we still have papers being published like "The modal ontological argument for atheism" that hinges on if s4 or s5 are valid.
Now this kind of paper is well argued and is now part of the academic literature, and that's good, but it's still a nerd snipe subject.
I mean leaving aside the problem of computability, representability, comparability of values, or the fact that agency exists in opposition (virus vs human, gazelle vs lion) and even a higher order framework to resolve those oppositions is a form of another agency in itself with its own implicit privileged vantage point, why does it sound to me that focusing on agency in itself is just another way of pushing protestant work ethic? What happens to non-teleological, non-productive existence for example?
The critique of anthropocentrism often risks smuggling in misanthropy whether intended or not; humans will still exist, their claims will count, and they cannot be reduced to mere agency - unless you are their line manager. Anyone who wants to shave that down has to present stronger arguments than centricity. In addition to proving that they can be anything other than anthropocentric - even if done through machines as their extensions - any person who claims to have access to the seat of objectivity sounds like a medieval templar shouting "deus vult" on their favorite proposition.
Philosophy has been too damn anthropocentric, too hung up on consciousness and other speculative nerd snipe time wasters that without observation we can argue about endlessly.
And now here we are and the academy is sleeping on the job while software devs have to figure it all out.
I've moved 50% of my time to morals for machina that is grounded in physics, I'm testing it out with unsloth right now, so far I think it works, the machines have stopped killing kyle at least.